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Transactional Legal Services, Triage, and  
Access to Justice 
Paul R. Tremblay
*
 
I. INTRODUCTION 
The provision of free legal services to entrepreneurs and emerging 
businesses has become much more prevalent in recent years.
1
 Private 
law firms offer small business services as part of their pro bono 
commitments.
2
 Law school clinics dedicated to entrepreneurship and 
small business development have proliferated in the past fifteen 
years.
3
 Some conventional poverty-law-focused legal services offices 
 
 * Clinical Professor and Associate Dean of Experiential Learning, Boston College Law 
School. I thank the participants at the scholarship roundtable on New Directions in Community 
Lawyering, Social Entrepreneurship, and Dispute Resolution at Washington University School 
of Law for their useful feedback and critique. I regret that I have not come close to addressing 
many of their insightful suggestions. All errors, of course, are mine. Janelle Peiczarka, Susan 
Lydon, and Nicole Hauspurg provided valuable research assistance on this project. 
 1. The prevalence of free or subsidized transactional legal services has been the subject 
of much commentary, especially within the academy. See, e.g., Deborah S. Kenn, Community 
Development Law and Legal Education, in ACADEMIC ENTREPRENEURSHIP AND 
COMMUNITY ENGAGEMENT 61–72 (Bruce R. Kingma ed., 2011); Susan R. Jones & 
Jacqueline Lainez, Enriching the Law School Curriculum: The Rise of Transactional Legal 
Clinics in U.S. Law Schools, 43 WASH. U. J.L. & POL’Y 85, 87–88 (2014); cf. Darian M. 
Ibrahim, How Do Start-Ups Obtain Their Legal Services?, 2012 WIS. L. REV. 333, 335 (2012) 
(noting the prohibitive cost of counsel for start-ups). The commentary emerges from a broader 
ongoing discussion of the relationship between law and entrepreneurship. See, e.g., Steven H. 
Hobbs, Toward a Theory of Law and Entrepreneurship, 26 CAP. U. L. REV. 241 (1997). 
 2. “[Law f]irms have . . . focused increasing attention on transactional pro bono, in 
which lawyers handle matters for organizations engaged in community economic development 
efforts.” Scott L. Cummings, The Politics of Pro Bono, 52 UCLA L. REV. 1, 149 (2004) 
[hereinafter Politics of Pro Bono]. See also James L. Baillie, Fulfilling the Promise of Business 
Law Pro Bono, 28 WM. MITCHELL L. REV. 1543 (2002); Thomas H. Morsch, Discovering 
Transactional Pro Bono, 72 UMKC L. REV. 423 (2003). 
 3. Jones & Lainez, supra note 1, at 85, 86 (“transactional legal clinics have grown 
exponentially” in recent years); Jayashri Srikantiah & Janet Martinez, Applying Negotiations 
Pedagogy to Clinical Teaching: Tools for Institutional Client Representation in Law School 
Clinics, 21 CLINICAL L. REV. 283, 284 (2014) (noting the prevalence of transactional clinics). 
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provide transactional services to eligible clients.
4
 Even some public 
interest law firms include small business representation in their 
portfolio of work for underserved communities.
5
 This trend raises 
questions about the policy justifications for allocating scarce 
lawyering resources toward enterprises that may not have any direct 
effect on the day-to-day struggles of low-income families living in 
disadvantaged communities. This Article represents one beginning 
attempt to canvass the arguments for and against dedicating legal 
resources in this way. It accepts as an organizing premise this 
sentiment articulated by Professor Rebecca Sharpless: “A central—if 
not the central—challenge for social justice lawyers is how, in a 
world of scarce resources, they should prioritize their goals and 
methods to maximize positive social change. We are constantly 
looking for practice visions to guide our allocation of scarce human 
capital.”6 
This Article seeks to understand the allocation challenge in the 
following way. The Article first observes that transactional legal 
services (TLS) tend to be viewed as less important matters when 
compared to litigation legal services (LLS) and evaluated using a 
triage-driven social justice metric. But that familiar and intuitively 
attractive conclusion requires reexamination if one adjusts the frame 
and evaluates TLS using a more long-term, capacity-building and 
capital-nurturing metric. Perhaps TLS ought not fare so poorly after 
all if the access-to-justice goal is reframed in that way. The trouble is, 
as the discussion will show, the available research and commentary 
 
 4. See Ben Quinones, Serving Clients in New Ways: Community Economic Development, 
CED on the Job, 27 CLEARINGHOUSE REV. 773, 773–74 (1993) (stressing the importance of 
economic development in legal services practice). For example, the Legal Aid Foundation of 
Los Angeles staffs a community economic development unit. See Community Economic 
Development, LEGAL AID FOUND. OF LOS ANGELES, http://www.lafla.org/service.php?sect= 
ced&sub=main (last visited Jan. 19, 2015). 
 5. See, e.g., ACCESS JUSTICE, PSC, http://www.accessjustice.net (full service, nonprofit 
law firm providing services to low- and moderate-income persons, and to qualified small 
businesses); The Public Law Center, Community Organizations Legal Assistance, THE PUBLIC 
LAW CENTER, http://www.publiclawcenter.org/services/community-organizations-legal-assistance/ 
(offering free legal services to microenterprises) (last visited May 19, 2015); VOLUNTEERS OF 
LEGAL SERVICE, http://www.volsprobono.org (providing pro bono legal assistance to 
microenterprises as well as low-income individuals) (last visited May 19, 2015). 
 6. Rebecca Sharpless, More Than One Lane Wide: Against Hierarchies of Helping in 
Progressive Legal Advocacy, 19 CLINICAL L. REV. 347, 349 (2012) (italics in the original). 
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discourage that optimism, especially for what we might call 
ecumenical, entrepreneurial TLS, which seems to have weak 
currency in a strategy to reduce poverty and to foster neighborhood 
economic growth. A more collectivist TLS, by contrast, appears to 
offer better long-term hope as a contributor to social change, 
although it encounters complicated questions about respecting the 
choices of the prospective clients who wish to be successful 
entrepreneurs. Before rejecting the idea that entrepreneurial TLS is 
justified under a social justice metric, the Article considers whether, 
in some settings, legal assistance to a creative entrepreneur ought to 
have as much weight in a triage calculation as some other, 
conventionally-accepted income-generating strategies relied upon by 
poverty-law advocates. 
The Article follows that general assessment of the policy 
justifications for TLS with a more focused and contextual discussion, 
exploring the implications of three likely sources of TLS: law firm 
pro bono, law school clinics, and public interest law firms. It 
concludes that TLS is more easily defended in the law firm and law 
school environments because of the differing missions of those 
institutions. For public interest law firms, the Article explains that 
current IRS rules discourage or perhaps even prohibit them for 
engaging in entrepreneurial TLS if the firms operate in the most 
common form of public interest firm. If instead such firms operate as 
legal services organizations, no IRS authority limits their freedom to 
offer TLS, but then the firms will be subject to the same triage and 
client-selection consideration described in the first half of the Article. 
II. THE ACCESS-TO-JUSTICE BASELINE 
A. Efficient Use of Scarce Legal Resources 
This Article begins its assessment of TLS from an access-to-
justice perspective. For those programs or institutions that have a 
choice about how to allocate scarce free legal services for those in 
need, is there a principled justification for using those resources for 
transactional work? For present purposes, TLS will refer to free or 
very low-cost legal assistance to entrepreneurs and businesses (both 
for-profit and nonprofit, and individualized or community-based) 
Washington University Open Scholarship
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intended not to resolve disputes in the way that litigators do, but to 
establish, organize, govern, and maintain the organization’s work.7 
At first blush one might conclude that ethical principles of triage 
and efficiency would support a policy favoring direct aid to 
individuals in distress rather than assistance to innovative businesses, 
however exciting those latter efforts might be. The following 
discussion will show why that argument has only limited merit. Even 
if the benchmark used to assess the value of transactional legal 
services was one emerging from the access-to-justice campaigns, 
those services offer important benefits. 
There is a monumental need for affordable legal services in the 
United States. While the “access to justice” movement’s concern is 
hardly a novel issue, the crisis of too few lawyers and too many 
needy clients continues to make news on a regular basis. In October 
2014, the Boston Bar Association published a comprehensive report 
lamenting the terrible gap in civil legal services for low- and 
moderate-income residents in Massachusetts.
8
 Quite soon, Samuel 
Estreicher and Joy Radice will publish an impressive collection of 
policy pieces addressing “access to civil justice for Americans of 
average means.”9 The number of unrepresented litigants in courts and 
administrative proceedings continues to grow, and, according to some 
reports, those unrepresented litigants fare poorly compared to 
litigants with counsel.
10
 Policy makers, foundations, and law firms 
 
 7. See ALICIA ALVAREZ & PAUL R. TREMBLAY, INTRODUCTION TO TRANSACTIONAL 
LAWYERING PRACTICE 1–10 (2013) (describing the scope of transactional work). 
 8. STATEWIDE TASK FORCE TO EXPAND CIVIL LEGAL AID IN MASS., BOSTON BAR 
ASS’N, INVESTING IN JUSTICE, A ROADMAP TO COST-EFFECTIVE FUNDING OF CIVIL 
LEGAL AID IN MASSACHUSETTS passim (2014). 
 9. BEYOND ELITE LAW: ACCESS TO CIVIL JUSTICE FOR AMERICANS OF AVERAGE 
MEANS (Samuel Estreicher & Joy Radice eds., forthcoming 2015). See also Bruce A. Boyer, 
Justice, Access to the Courts, and the Right to Free Counsel for Indigent Parents: The 
Continuing Scourge of Lassiter v. Department of Social Services of Durham, 36 LOY. U. CHI. 
L.J. 363 (2005); Deborah J. Cantrell, Justice for Interests of the Poor: The Problem of 
Navigating the System Without Counsel, 70 FORDHAM L. REV. 1573, 1573–74 (2002); Patricia 
E. Roberts, From the “War On Poverty” to Pro Bono: Access to Justice Remains Elusive for 
Too Many, Including Our Veterans, 34 B.C. J.L. & SOC. JUST. 341, 341 (2014) (Symposium, 50 
Years After the “War on Poverty”: Evaluating Past Enactments and Innovative Approaches for 
Addressing Poverty in the 21st Century). 
 10. See Jeanne Charn, Celebrating the “Null” Finding: Evidence-Based Strategies for 
Improving Access to Legal Services, 122 YALE L.J. 2206, 2217–24 (2013) (describing the 
https://openscholarship.wustl.edu/law_journal_law_policy/vol48/iss1/8
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continue to explore avenues for subsidizing more lawyers for those 
who cannot afford market rates. Most notably, a “Civil Gideon” 
movement has emerged, advocating for the appointment of counsel at 
public expense for individuals facing serious civil proceedings who 
cannot afford counsel.
11
 In addition, many creative programs 
supporting the development of private practices aimed at delivering 
affordable legal services to modest-means clients have appeared.
12
  If 
we can afford to offer free or subsidized legal services, the argument 
holds, this is where the focus should be. Needy individuals and 
families suffer terrible injustices every day of the week. 
Given this crisis, institutions that provide or fund free legal 
services encounter powerful moral and political arguments to 
increase the availability of lawyers for poor litigants. And those 
arguments plainly hold sway. Far fewer foundations and legal 
services providers allocate resources for entrepreneurship compared 
to their support for lawyers in courts and agencies, most likely 
because of those triage concerns.
13
 The triage-driven sentiments of 
the access-to-justice campaigns plainly treat dispute resolution as 
more critically important than transactional business development. 
That treatment is most likely sensible and defensible, and fits well 
with our collective intuitions, but it deserves some further scrutiny. 
 
studies); Richard W. Painter, Pro Se Litigation in Times of Financial Hardship—A Legal Crisis 
and Its Solutions, 45 FAM. L.Q. 45 (2011). 
 11. See, e.g., Ingrid V. Eagly, Gideon’s Migration, 122 YALE L.J. 2282 (2013); Russell 
Engler, Connecting Self-Representation to Civil Gideon: What Existing Data Reveal About 
When Counsel Is Most Needed, 37 FORDHAM URB. L.J. 37 (2010). The phrase “Civil Gideon” 
references the decision of the United States Supreme Court declaring that individuals charged 
with certain serious crimes have a constitutional right to appointed counsel for their defense. 
See Gideon v. Wainwright, 372 U.S. 335 (1963). 
 12. See REINVENTING THE PRACTICE OF LAW (Luz Herrera ed., 2014); HANOVER 
RESEARCH, LAW SCHOOL SOLO PRACTICE INCUBATORS AND LEGAL RESIDENCY 
PROGRAMS (2012), http://www.gaje.org/wp-content/uploads/2014/10/Hanover-Report.pdf (last 
visited Jan. 15, 2015); Fred Rooney & Justin Steele, Exporting the Legal Incubator: A 
Conversation with Fred Rooney, 9 U. MASS L. REV. 108, 111–13 (2014). 
 13. The prevailing discussion of the application of triage principles in legal services and 
public interest practice does not typically include references to work for small businesses. See I. 
Glenn Cohen, Rationing Legal Services, 5 J. LEGAL ANALYSIS 221, 244–45 (2013); Paul R. 
Tremblay, Acting “A Very Moral Type of God”: Triage Among Poor Clients, 67 FORDHAM L. 
REV. 2475 (1999) [hereinafter Triage]; Richard Zorza, The Access to Justice “Sorting Hat”: 
Towards a System of Triage and Intake that Maximizes Access and Outcomes, 89 DENV. U. L. 
REV. 859 (2012). See also Ronald W. Staudt & Andrew P. Medeiros, Access to Justice and 
Technology Clinics: A 4% Solution, 88 CHI.-KENT. L. REV. 695 (2013). 
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For ease of the following discussion, let us refer to the Civil Gideon-
driven, court- and agency-focused representation characteristic of 
most legal services delivery schemes as “litigation legal services,” or 
“LLS,” to contrast with the “TLS” which is the focus of this Article. 
Of course these categories represent caricatures of more nuanced 
programmatic policies and representation models,
14
 but the cleaner 
contrast may serve adequately for the proceeding analysis. A 
supporter of increased TLS would not readily accept the presumption 
that TLS does not contribute to alleviation of the access-to-justice 
challenges. Such a TLS advocate might make an argument that looks 
something like this: 
Focusing one’s efforts on LLS is obviously important, but it is, 
at the same time, shortsighted. LLS helps allocate scarce 
societal resources among low-income families, or, more 
accurately perhaps, it transfers some of those resources from 
the haves to the have-nots. Yet the enterprise leaves the pot of 
those resources relatively fixed and finite. In addition to 
addressing the immediate needs of persons involved in legal 
disputes, policy makers must also support efforts to increase 
the available resources so that there are fewer low-income 
families competing for them. TLS is a healthy way to address 
longer-term issues plaguing underserved communities.
15
 TLS 
helps businesses thrive, and thriving businesses create 
economic opportunity. Not only do those businesses increase 
the capital and wealth of their owners, but they also they lead 
to jobs, and increased employment spurs neighborhood 
vitality. Supporting neighborhood business initiatives in order 
to increase employment opportunities and stimulate more 
 
 14. The LLS model oversimplifies what all effective neighborhood legal services offices 
provide to poor clients, and minimizes the role of impact litigation, community organizing, and 
legislative advocacy which are essential to the mission of those programs. The TLS reference 
implies lawyering for an individual who, or small business that, hopes to make a successful go 
at a new commercial endeavor, and implicitly neglects transactional work on behalf of social 
enterprises, community groups, and nonprofits.  
 15. See Laurie A. Morin, Legal Services Attorneys as Partners in Community Economic 
Development: Creating Wealth for Poor Communities Through Cooperative Economics, 5 
UDC/DCSL L. REV. 125, 132 (2000) (arguing that self-employment through new businesses is 
a “crucial component of sustained change” in poor communities). 
https://openscholarship.wustl.edu/law_journal_law_policy/vol48/iss1/8
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investment in neighborhoods lacking commercial activity is an 
important component of any community economic 
development (CED) strategy.
16
 
Put another way, the real problems leading to the great need for 
LLS are not the absence of enough lawyers, but the absence of 
enough power, opportunity, and capital among those who are the 
clients of LLS. The best social policy is not necessarily one that 
offers more LLS; it may be one that creates and nurtures 
structures that diminish the need for LLS. 
 
As Michelle Jacobs has written, 
Traditional notions of “access to justice” entertained by the 
majority in the profession narrowly embrace only helping the 
poor to have a voice in court. There is no commitment to alter 
fundamentally the legal structures which help institutionalize 
poverty. . . . In order to fundamentally change access to law 
and justice for poor people, lawyers would need to accept the 
premise that the conditions which produce poverty must 
change.
17
 
 The above arguments contend that an initiative aimed toward the 
development of long-term stability, power, and capital—especially in 
underserved communities—is fully warranted as a matter of a just 
social policy.
18
 While the powerfully-felt “rescue mission”19 can 
 
 16. See, e.g., Susan R. Jones, Small Business and Community Economic Development: 
Transactional Lawyering for Social Change and Economic Justice, 4 CLINICAL L. REV. 195 
(1997); Greg Volz & Brad Caftel, Job Strategies in the Era of Welfare Reform: A Community-
Based Model of Legal Services, 33 CLEARINGHOUSE REV. 569, 578–80 (2000); Michael E. 
Porter, The Competitive Advantage of the Inner City, HARV. BUS. REV., May-June 1995, at 55, 
61–62; William P. Quigley, Reflections of Community Organizers: Lawyering for 
Empowerment of Community Organizations, 21 OHIO N.U. L. REV. 455, 455 (1994); Daniel S. 
Shah, Lawyering for Empowerment: Community Development and Social Change, 6 CLINICAL 
L. REV. 217 (1999). 
 17. Michelle S. Jacobs, Pro Bono Work and Access to Justice for the Poor: Real Change 
or Imagined Change?, 48 FLA. L. REV. 509, 514–15 (1996). 
 18. See Alicia Alvarez, Community Development Clinics: What Does Poverty Have to Do 
With Them?, 34 FORDHAM URB. L.J. 1269, 1269 (2006) (community development clinics “must 
. . . acknowledge and focus their efforts on the elimination . . . of poverty”); Volz & Caftel, 
supra note 16, at 569 (“[W]e begin by describing a relatively new approach—called sector 
employment intervention (SEI)—to solving poverty. SEI . . . seeks to connect residents or poor 
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often distort resource allocation choices, as the desire to assist those 
in distress in the present can easily overshadow the longer-term 
strategies that might effect meaningful change, a principled response 
to poverty must overcome such distortion.
20
 Every public health 
initiative or program rests on the principle that short-term gains must 
at times be sacrificed for long-term benefits.
21
 TLS serves, in this 
sense, as a form of public health legal services. As the health care 
field understands quite well, a vibrant social policy must include 
triage-driven urgent care along with initiatives aimed at prevention 
and health maintenance over the long term.
22
 
 
communities to employment opportunities, livable wages and benefits, good working 
conditions, and advancement opportunities.”). 
 19. See Peter Margulies, Re-framing Empathy in Clinical Legal Education, 5 CLINICAL L. 
REV. 605, 620–21 (1999); Paul R. Tremblay, Rebellious Lawyering, Regnant Lawyering, and 
Street-Level Bureaucracy, 43 HASTINGS L.J. 947, 959–68 (1992) [hereinafter Rebellious 
Lawyering]. See also Stephen Ellmann, Lawyering for Justice in a Flawed Democracy, 90 
COLUM. L. REV. 116, 175 (1990) (reviewing DAVID LUBAN, LAWYERS AND JUSTICE (1988)) 
(arguing that “human desperation” is a more apt term than “urgency” within triage discussions). 
 20. While not necessarily supporting entrepreneurial TLS, a vast collection of work 
supports the essential notion that long-term structural change is as important as, if not more 
important than, individual representation in promoting social justice. For a sampling of the 
literature, much of which emanates from community economic development visions, see, e.g., 
WILLIAM H. SIMON, THE COMMUNITY ECONOMIC DEVELOPMENT MOVEMENT: LAW, BUSINESS, 
AND THE NEW SOCIAL POLICY (2001); Wendy A. Bach, Governance, Accountability, and the 
New Poverty Agenda, 2010 WIS. L. REV. 239 (2010); Sheila R. Foster & Brian Glick, 
Integrative Lawyering: Navigating the Political Economy of Urban Redevelopment, 95 CALIF. 
L. REV. 1999 (2007); Quigley, supra note 16; Shah, supra note 16. For an insightful argument 
that LLS is equally important, see Sharpless, supra note 6. 
 21. Jeffrey Levi et al., Prevention for a Healthier America: Investments in Disease 
Prevention Yield Significant Savings, Stronger Communities, Washington, DC: Trust for 
America’s Health (2008), available at http://healthyamericans.org/reports/prevention08/ 
Prevention08.pdf; Jean C. O’Connor et al., Paying for Prevention: A Critical Opportunity for 
Public Health, 41 J.L. MED. & ETHICS 69, 71 (2013) (“The public health system is uniquely 
positioned to develop and implement primary prevention strategies in the community which are 
essential to the success of coordinated clinical health services.”); Lindsay F. Wiley, Health Law 
as Social Justice, 24 CORNELL J.L. & PUB. POL’Y 47, 51 (2013) (health care policy’s 
commitment to social justice “ranges far beyond individual health-care rights to focus on 
collective needs and problem solving with regard to the social determinants of health, broadly 
defined”). Cf. Rose Cuison Villazor, Community Lawyering: An Approach to Addressing 
Inequalities in Access to Health Care for Poor, of Color and Immigrant Communities, 8 N.Y.U. 
J. LEGIS. & PUB. POL’Y 35, 37 (2004) (describing need to “de-emphasize litigation as the 
primary tool for advancing social justice”).  
 22. See, e.g., U.S. Preventive Services Task Force, THE GUIDE TO CLINICAL PREVENTIVE 
SERVICES 2014 v–vii (2014), http://www.ahrq.gov/professionals/clinicians-providers/ guidelines-
recommendations/guide/cpsguide.pdf (last visited May 18, 2015); Viviana Balanescu, 
Prevention is better than cure, say Romanian doctors, 89 BULLETIN OF THE WORLD HEALTH 
https://openscholarship.wustl.edu/law_journal_law_policy/vol48/iss1/8
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B. Transactional Legal Services as an Empowerment Enterprise 
An argument that lawyers committed to challenging poverty ought 
to eschew LLS in favor of a more structural empowerment agenda is 
hardly a new one. That theme serves as the central focus of what we 
might call the “rebellious lawyering” approach to poverty law, which 
emerged in the late 1980s and is still a vital component of progressive 
representational thinking today. Many observers, notably Lucie 
White, Gerald López, and Anthony Alfieri, articulated a critique of 
conventional poverty lawyering that focused on the privileging of 
lawyer expertise in solving client problems.
23
 These observers argued 
explicitly for a relationship in which lawyer expertise ought to be 
downplayed in favor of client strategic leadership and inclusion of 
client stories and narratives.
24
 The arguments were trenchant: lawyers 
do their poor clients no lasting benefits by achieving results using 
technical expertise for the clients, rather than developing meaningful 
resolutions of disputes with the clients, and with the clients as the 
creators of the strategies.
25
 Lucie White’s story of Mrs. G’s welfare 
hearing stands as the preeminent example of that theme.
26
 Lawyers 
 
ORG. 248, 248–49 (2011); Steven H. Woolf et al., The Economic Argument for Disease 
Prevention: Distinguishing Between Value and Savings (P’ship for Prevention 2009), 
https://www.prevent.org/data/files/initiatives/economicargument fordiseaseprevention.pdf (last 
visited May 18, 2015); C. Patterson & Larry W. Chambers, Preventive Health Care, 345 THE 
LANCET 1611, 1611 (1995). 
 23. See, e.g., Lucie E. White, Subordination, Rhetorical Survival Skills, and Sunday 
Shoes: Notes on the Hearing of Mrs. G., 38 BUFF. L. REV. 1 (1990) [hereinafter Mrs. G]; Lucie 
E. White, Collaborative Lawyering in the Field? On Mapping the Paths from Rhetoric to 
Practice, 1 CLINICAL L. REV. 157 (1994); GERALD P. LÓPEZ, REBELLIOUS LAWYERING: ONE 
CHICANO’S VISION OF PROGRESSIVE LAW PRACTICE (1992); Anthony V. Alfieri, 
Reconstructive Poverty Law Practice: Learning Lessons of Client Narrative, 100 YALE L.J. 
2107 (1991) [hereinafter Reconstructive Poverty Law Practice]; Anthony V. Alfieri, 
Impoverished Practices, 81 GEO. L.J. 2567 (1993); Anthony V. Alfieri, Disabled Clients, 
Disabling Lawyers, 43 HASTINGS L.J. 769 (1992). Scott Cummings relies on those three 
thinkers in his evaluation of progressive CED. See Scott L. Cummings, Community Economic 
Development as Progressive Politics: Towards a Grassroots Movement for Economic Justice, 
54 STAN. L. REV. 399 (2001) [hereinafter Grassroots Movement], as did I in my assessment of 
regnant lawyering. See also Tremblay, Rebellious Lawyering, supra note 19. 
 24. See Binny Miller, Give Them Back Their Lives: Recognizing Client Narrative in Case 
Theory, 93 MICH. L. REV. 485 (1994) [hereinafter Recognizing Client Narrative]. 
 25. Alvarez, supra note 18, at 1273–75. 
 26. In her Essay, Professor White describes her relationship as the attorney for Mrs. G, 
who faced a hearing on welfare overpayment. The piece focuses on the strategic divide between 
White’s plan to craft Mrs. G’s story as an estoppel story, resulting from a county government 
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who privilege their own professional visions over the felt 
commitments of clients do those clients no favors, and possibly cause 
them harm. 
This strand of community lawyering emphasized legal work (or, 
perhaps, not-quite-legal work)
27
 that enhanced the power of 
disadvantaged populations. In critiquing what López termed 
“regnant” lawyering, these scholars discouraged litigation strategies 
that failed to alter the status quo landscapes, even if those strategies 
accomplished short-term gain.
28
 Scott Cummings and Ingrid Eagly 
describe the project in this way: “By shifting the analysis away from 
results-oriented legal strategies and toward process-oriented client 
empowerment, [López and White] displaced lawyers as the focal 
point of social change practice and further undermined the legitimacy 
of [LLS-type] law reform tactics.”29 In another pioneering work, 
William Quigley offered a like-minded prescription to progressive 
lawyers: 
The lawyer who wants to serve poor people must put his skills 
to the task of helping poor people organize themselves. . . . The 
purpose of empowerment lawyering with community 
organizations is to enable a group of people to gain control of 
the forces which affect their lives. The substance of this 
lawyering is primarily the representation of groups rather than 
 
mistake, and Mrs. G’s necessity story, which seemed to have less conventional legal force but 
fit the lived experience of the client better. White, Mrs. G, supra note 23, at 27. See Ruth 
Margaret Buchanan, Context, Continuity, and Difference in Poverty Law Scholarship, 48 U. 
MIAMI L. REV. 999, 1061 (1994) (discussing the power and reach of the Mrs. G story). 
 27. A related theme of that progressive cohort was deprofessionalization of dispute 
resolution, and the encouragement of solutions relying less on the skill of lawyers. See Alfieri, 
Impoverished Practices, supra note 23; Eduardo R.C. Capulong, Client Activism in Progressive 
Lawyering Theory, 16 CLINICAL L. REV. 109, 123 (2009); Gerald P. Lόpez, Lay Lawyering, 32 
UCLA L. REV. 1, 33 (1984); Lucie E. White, To Learn and Teach: Lessons From Driefontein 
on Lawyering and Power, 1998 WIS. L. REV. 699 (1988). 
 28. “Regnant” lawyering is Gerald López’s term for the traditional conception of good 
faith, earnest poverty lawyering that primarily involves direct individual client representation 
and “impact” litigation. See LÓPEZ, supra note 23, at 23–24; Janine Sisak, If the Shoe Doesn’t 
Fit . . . Reformulating Rebellious Lawyering to Encompass Community Group Representation, 
25 FORDHAM URB. L.J. 873, 876 (1998).  
 29. Scott L. Cummings & Ingrid V. Eagly, A Critical Reflection on Law and Organizing, 
48 UCLA L. REV. 443, 460 (2001). 
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individuals. This style calls for lawyering which joins, rather 
than leads, the persons represented.
30
 
These writers share a growing and passionate commitment to work 
that bolsters and sustains the power of underserved communities and 
individuals within those communities, employing strategies different 
from the more conventional, individually-focused legal services 
aimed at assisting low-income clients to succeed in their disputes 
within courts and agencies.
31
 
Supporters of TLS may argue that lawyering for entrepreneurs, 
businesses, and organizations can accomplish the goals embraced by 
the rebellious strand of the community lawyering movement. TLS 
strategies, if successful, foster the development of autonomy and 
capital among the clients who participate.
32
 Their most important 
investment returns tend to be long-term, rather than short-term. And, 
contrary to regnant lawyering activity, TLS focuses the available 
lawyering expertise on supporting and furthering strategies that 
originate with the clients, rather than from the lawyers. In this 
respect, viewed from that access-to-justice lens with which we began, 
TLS has much richer potential value, and greater justification, than 
one might initially have surmised, if those above assumptions and 
arguments are sound. 
C. The Critique of TLS as an Empowerment Enterprise 
The arguments that TLS furthers the development of power within 
underserved communities are attractive, but they are subject to 
important critiques deserving of careful inquiry. Whether 
transactional assistance to entrepreneurs serves empowerment ends is 
a considerably complicated question. In many respects this is the 
most challenging issue for TLS supporters to confront. The worry 
about allocating scarce legal resources to TLS arises in two separate 
 
 30. Quigley, supra note 16, at 455–56. 
 31. The literature is wide-ranging. For a review of the field, see Ascanio Piomelli, 
Appreciating Collaborative Lawyering, 6 CLINICAL L. REV. 427, 440 (2000); Ascanio 
Piomelli, Sensibilities for Social Justice Lawyers, 10 HASTINGS RACE & POVERTY L.J. 177 
(2013). For an insightfully critical review of that stance, see Rebecca Sharpless, supra note 6. 
 32. Morin, supra note 15, at 132. 
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ways. First, and most obviously, the entrepreneurs assisted by TLS 
may not be part of any disadvantaged community—indeed, they may 
be otherwise successful graduates of elite colleges and universities 
with many advantages and opportunities. TLS supporters must 
acknowledge that reality, and address whether a robust defense of 
that form of lawyering should embrace only TLS on behalf of 
members of underrepresented communities. Second, and perhaps a 
bit less obviously, entrepreneurial TLS (as opposed to community-
building TLS, a distinction to be developed below) might be a 
particularly poor vehicle for developing meaningful capital within 
underserved communities. This Article considers each of these 
worries in turn. 
1. Which Prospective TLS Clients Should Qualify? 
If TLS supporters seek to defend the provision of free lawyer 
services on behalf of entrepreneurs because that effort will aid in the 
long run to diminish poverty and to strengthen neighborhoods, that 
proposition is more difficult to sustain if the clients of TLS services 
have no connection to communities of color or other underserved 
groups and neighborhoods. There are, of course, many creative, 
innovative entrepreneurs with promising business-development ideas 
who cannot afford counsel. Many, if not most, participants in 
business incubators do not have a great deal of money, precisely 
because they use their available time working on their exciting 
business leads which have not yet managed to attract funding or to 
find customers.
33
 Since the startup founders typically have limited 
funding for their business development, their capacity to pay market 
rates for legal counsel is not very likely.
34
 For purposes of affording 
 
 33. Observers often report the need for new businesses and entrepreneurs to have access 
to affordable counsel. See Susan R. Jones, Promoting Social and Economic Justice Through 
Interdisciplinary Work in Transactional Law, 14 WASH. U. J.L. & POL’Y 249, 255–56 (2004); 
Dana Thompson, Accelerating the Growth of the Next Generation of Innovators, 8 OHIO ST. 
ENTREP. BUS. L.J. 379, 382 (2013); Anthony J. Luppino, Introduction: Symposium on Law, 
Entrepreneurship, and Economic Recovery, 78 UMKC L. REV. 319, 321 (2009); Jeff Thomas, 
The Legal Spark, 78 UMKC L. REV. 455, 456–57 (2009). 
 34. See Ibrahim, supra note 1; Thomas, supra note 33, at 456; Scott Edward Walker, Top 
10 Reasons Why Entrepreneurs Hate Lawyers (Venture Hacks 2010) http://venturehacks.com/ 
articles/hate-lawyers (last visited May 19, 2015). 
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private lawyers, these entrepreneurs are “indigent.”35 Many creative 
entrepreneurs, though, attended good schools, come from families 
with money, and, as a result, could be supporting themselves rather 
nicely if they were less entrepreneurial. These individuals comprise 
the client pool for much of the most cutting-edge TLS services. 
It is therefore difficult to defend what we might call an 
“ecumenical” TLS, through which free legal services become 
available to the most innovative and promising entrepreneurs 
regardless of their home community or background. At least when 
viewed through the access-to-justice lens, assisting Cal Tech, 
Washington University, or Boston College graduates to develop new 
software apps that just might be the rage in a few years is simply not 
the most productive use of scarce legal resources given the usual 
metrics for evaluating allocation of those resources. This is not to say 
that wide-ranging entrepreneurial TLS is not justified and ought not 
be offered by some providers—only that an ecumenical account of 
TLS is difficult to justify based upon an access-to-justice benchmark. 
Other good reasons besides the access-to-justice goals might justify 
wide-ranging TLS in certain contexts, such as law firm pro bono 
efforts or law school clinics. Part III of this Article addresses those 
possibilities. Before we reach that topic, we must first consider a less-
ecumenical account of TLS, one focused on entrepreneurship 
emanating from within underserved communities. 
2. Focused Entrepreneurial TLS as an Anti-Poverty, 
Empowerment Enterprise 
Many startup entrepreneurs live, work, or grew up in underserved 
communities. Imagine a program that dedicated its free lawyering 
capacity to support of entrepreneurs who have connections to 
 
 35. There remains uncertainty in many jurisdictions on the question of how the income 
limits that typically apply to prospective clients of legal services organizations ought to apply to 
prospective clients who need transactional legal services. One identifiable context for that 
consideration is that of the student practice rules of the respective states, and whether a small 
business that cannot afford private counsel ought to be considered as “indigent” for purposes of 
student representation. For a discussion of these themes, see Baillie, supra note 2, at 1564–65 
(discussing law firm pro bono); Jones & Lainez, supra note 1, at 116–19 (discussing the student 
practice rules).  
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disadvantaged neighborhoods, doing so intending to accomplish 
access-to-justice goals. The question we consider here is whether that 
strategy would be justifiable given access-to-justice or similar 
programmatic social justice ends. To add some important texture to 
the question, imagine that the program did not distinguish among the 
types of startup businesses the entrepreneurs chose to develop, so 
long as the business had some connection to an underserved 
community. The free legal services would be available, for example, 
to the creators of an innovative mobile app called “Drizly,” which 
lets users order alcohol for quick home delivery,
36
 as well as to the 
founders of Metrowest Worker Center, Inc./Casa do 
Trabalhador/Casa del Trabajador, an immigrant worker rights 
center,
37
 so long as the founders had some important connection to a 
community that had been ignored, distressed, or underserved. In 
working with either of these businesses, the program would 
accomplish its mission to use the available legal talent to support 
business initiatives emanating from the communities historically 
short-changed by conventional economic policies. 
That less-ecumenical strategy, while more justifiable than the 
broader approach described above, still may come up short when 
evaluated through the access-to-justice, poverty-fighting, or 
community-building benchmarks. Contrary to some earlier 
aspirations, observers have concluded that focused, individualistic, 
entrepreneurial strategies promise little success as anti-poverty 
measures.
38
 That opinion has earned adherence in community 
economic development (CED) literature. CED writers have 
encountered policies aimed at developing homegrown, 
 
 36. This is a real business. See DRIZLY, http://www.drizly.com (last visited May 19, 
2015).  
 37. This is also a real nonprofit organization. See GUIDESTAR CHARITY CHECK, 
http://www.guidestar.org/ReportOrganization.aspx?ein=27-2850017 (last visited May 19, 
2015). The founders of Drizly.com and Metrowest Worker Center were clients of the 
Community Enterprise Clinic where I teach, and many students worked with both clients and 
learned a great deal in the process. 
 38. See, e.g., NANCY C. JURIK, BOOTSTRAP DREAMS: U.S. MICROENTERPRISE 
DEVELOPMENT IN AN ERA OF WELFARE REFORM 154–55 (2005); Cummings, Grassroots 
Movement, supra note 23; Rashmi Dyal-Chand & James V. Rowan, Developing Capabilities, 
Not Entrepreneurs: A New Theory for Community Economic Development, 42 HOFSTRA L. 
REV. 839 (2014). 
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entrepreneurial businesses in underserved neighborhoods, the goals 
of which were to diminish the effects of poverty through the 
emergence of vibrant commercial activity, with jobs and street-level 
vitality.
39
 CED writers note that such policies have not had 
appreciable effect on the quality of life in the affected communities. 
Scott Cummings has described a wave of criticism “of the apolitical, 
free-market approach to CED . . . question[ing] the efficacy of 
business development strategies that fail to address larger economic 
and political forces.”40 
More recently, Rashmi Dyal-Chand and James Rowan have 
argued, using both economic theory and empirical data, that 
“[entrepreneurship] has thus far failed as a framework for widespread 
and reliable local economic development and poverty alleviation.”41 
Dyal-Chand and Rowan demonstrate that successful entrepreneurs 
need to have sufficient capital available—both financial and social—
to endure the significant risks inherent in startup enterprises. That 
capital, and the resources necessary to sustain the risks involved, are 
inevitably scarce in communities where poverty is most prevalent.
42
  
Some such entrepreneurs succeed in spite of those obstacles, of 
course, but they argue that a CED strategy grounded in an 
expectation of persistent successes is shortsighted. It will not 
accomplish the economic development goals its proponents hope, and 
it diverts resources from the kind of transactional CED that might 
serve to alter the underlying conditions that sustain poverty.
43
 
If these observers are correct, an access-to-justice justification for 
focused, less-ecumenical TLS remains elusive. As noted above, there 
 
 39. See Susan R. Jones & Roger A. Clay, Jr., What Is Community Economic 
Development?, in BUILDING HEALTHY COMMUNITIES: A GUIDE TO COMMUNITY ECONOMIC 
DEVELOPMENT FOR ADVOCATES, LAWYERS, AND POLICYMAKERS 3, 3–5 (Susan R. Jones & 
Roger A. Clay, Jr. eds., 2009); Michael E. Porter, The Competitive Advantage of the Inner City, 
HARV. BUS. REV., May–June 1995, at 55, 56. 
 40. Cummings, supra note 23, at 407. See also Louise A. Howells, Dimension of 
Microenterprise: A Critical Look at Microenterprise as a Tool to Alleviate Poverty, 9 J. 
AFFORDABLE HOUSING & CMTY. DEV. L. 161 (2000). 
 41. Dyal-Chand & Rowan, supra note 38, at 839. 
 42. Id. at 844, 859–60. 
 43. See id. at 867 (noting “the disturbing implications of using a mode of poverty 
alleviation that targets only a ‘chosen few,’” and suggesting that “practitioners focus on the 
question of how best to alleviate poverty and produce local economic development by creating 
a means of sustainable income for people below the poverty line”). 
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may be other good reasons aside from access-to-justice principles for 
focused TLS; such a strategy would contribute to some increase in 
the chances of success among entrepreneurs from underserved 
communities and therefore has much to offer. But there remains one 
more permutation of TLS as a poverty-challenging strategy, one with 
seemingly greater principled justification. That permutation we might 
call collectivist-focused TLS. The next subsection describes that 
strategy. 
3. Collectivist TLS as an Anti-Poverty, Empowerment Enterprise 
The critics of entrepreneurial TLS do not argue for more short-
term, regnant lawyering in the mode of the Civil Gideon campaigns. 
They search for and support TLS strategies to accomplish meaningful 
redistribution of power, the development of genuine capital in 
underserved communities, and greater autonomy for those living in 
those communities.
44
 The critics do not dismiss TLS as a proper 
lawyering strategy; they object to viscerally seductive, but ultimately 
ineffectual, entrepreneurship TLS.
45
 Instead, those progressive 
writers propose a community-based, collectivist TLS, which they 
argue will be much more likely to accomplish the long-term 
empowerment and poverty-challenging goals described above.
46
 Scott 
Cummings, for example, outlines “an alternative model of politically 
engaged CED that integrates legal advocacy and community 
organizing to build cross-neighborhood coalitions that promote 
broad-based economic reform.”47 He urges lawyers and policy-
makers “to deploy transactional lawyering in a way that builds 
organized low-income constituencies that can challenge the 
distribution of political power.”48 Focused entrepreneurial TLS is not 
such an approach. The kind of TLS he urges includes living wage 
 
 44. See Cummings, Grassroots Movement, supra note 23, at 478–83; Howells, supra note 
40, at 166–71; Dyal-Chand & Rowan, supra note 38, at 888. 
 45. See Cummings, Grassroots Movement, supra note 23, at 447–51; Dyal-Chand & 
Rowan, supra note 38, at 843 (“Most importantly for our purposes, despite the enormous 
potential that entrepreneurship seems to hold, it thus far has failed as a framework for 
widespread and reliable local economic development and poverty relief.”). 
 46. See Cummings, Grassroots Movement, supra note 23, at 399, 472–78. 
 47. Id. at 399. 
 48. Id. at 459. 
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campaigns, worker cooperatives, and jobs initiatives, not the creation 
of small startup businesses.
49
 
Carmen Huertas-Noble has developed similar arguments in her 
description of effective TLS provided to worker organizations.
50
 She 
argues that progressive transactional lawyers should encourage 
clients to create worker cooperatives when they are choosing among 
business entities, instead of the typical corporation or LLC models. 
She writes: 
Worker-owned cooperatives can foster two essential goals of 
empowerment-centered [CED]: (1) promoting individual 
efficacy through meaningful job creation and (2) promoting 
collective empowerment by keeping jobs, income and profits 
within the community and by serving as a space for 
community organizing that enables cooperative members to 
participate in the larger economic justice movement. In this 
way, a worker-owned cooperative can empower not only its 
members, a laudable achievement in and of itself, but also 
larger segments of communities.
51
 
Dyal-Chand and Rowan, while pessimistic about the achievement 
prospects of entrepreneurial TLS, embrace the long view of TLS as 
an alternative to regnant, individualist representation. Like 
Cummings and Huertas-Noble, they argue for collective action in the 
work that progressive transactional lawyers accomplish: “A . . . 
critical component for success is collective action, either within the 
business or with a network of similar businesses. When collective 
action produces success, an increase in power vests with the 
participants.”52 
Dyal-Chand and Rowan, crafting a “capabilities approach” to TLS 
emerging from the writing of the economist and scholar Amartya 
 
 49. Id. at 399. 
 50. Carmen Huertas-Noble, Promoting Worker-Owned Cooperative as a CED 
Empowerment Strategy: A Case Study of Colors and Lawyering in Support of Participatory 
Decision-Making and Meaningful Social Change, 17 CLINICAL L. REV. 255 (2010).  
 51. Id. at 266. 
 52. Dyal-Chand & Rowan, supra note 38, at 879. 
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Sen,
53
 endorse the creation of worker cooperatives
54
 as well as 
business models (for those not established as cooperatives) that 
prioritize the needs of workers over those of the owners of the 
entity.
55
 Laurie Hauber agrees: “To be a community-centered 
program . . . it is imperative a program is structured with the 
following three elements as its foundation: (i) a ‘holistic approach,’ 
(ii) ‘empowerment through knowledge,’ and (iii) ’mechanisms of 
accountability.’”56 Hauber describes a community-based 
entrepreneurship assistance program she helped develop in Boston, 
whose mission supports those businesses that respond to the needs of 
the local community and emerge from participatory decision-making 
within neighborhoods.
57
 
These writers are persuasive. Organizations with available legal 
capital to use for social justice ends are justified in using that capital 
for collectivist, community-enhancing TLS. That conclusion, 
however, triggers some discomforting reactions. 
4. Objections to the Collectivist TLS Focus 
If one embraces the insights about the effectiveness of collectivist 
TLS relative to entrepreneurial TLS, the question of “who decides” 
surfaces.
58
 Some versions of progressive lawyering theory emphasize 
the centrality of client narrative and client autonomy within the 
lawyering collaborations. As noted earlier, the critics of conventional 
 
 53. Id. at 884–87 (relying on AMARTYA SEN, THE IDEA OF JUSTICE (2009); AMARTYA 
SEN, DEVELOPMENT AS FREEDOM (1999). See also Amartya Sen, Capability and Well-Being, in 
THE QUALITY OF LIFE 30 (Martha C. Nussbaum & Amartya Sen eds., 1993); Amartya Sen, 
Conceptualizing and Measuring Poverty, in POVERTY AND INEQUALITY 47 (David B. Grusky & 
Ravi Kanbur eds., 2006). 
 54. Dyal-Chand & Rowan, supra note 38, at 897–98. 
 55. Id. at 901–02. 
 56. Laurie Hauber, Promoting Economic Justice Through Transactional Community-
Centered Lawyering, 27 ST. LOUIS U. PUB. L. REV. 3, 6–7 (2007).  
 57. Id. at 28–29. See also Gowri J. Krishna, Worker Cooperative Creation as Progressive 
Lawyering? Moving Beyond the One-Person, One-Vote Floor, 34 BERKELEY J. EMP. & LAB. L. 
65 (2013); Ariana R. Levinson, Founding Worker Cooperatives: Social Movement Theory and 
the Law, 14 NEV. L.J. 322 (2014); Alicia E. Plerhoples, Representing Social Enterprise, 20 
CLINICAL L. REV. 215, 229–30 (2013). 
 58. See Troy E. Elder, Poor Clients, Informed Consent, and the Ethics of Rejection, 20 
GEO. J. LEGAL ETHICS 989 (2007) (exploring the tensions involved in poverty lawyers choosing 
clients based on community needs). 
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regnant lawyering objected to the silencing of client voice in poverty 
law representation, and the privileging of the lawyer’s perspective.59  
A more substantive, genuine lawyering practice, those commentators 
assert, will embrace client stories, preferences, and goals. Reyna 
Ramolete Hayashi, describing the need for TLS representation of 
domestic worker cooperatives, captures this sentiment well: 
[I]nserting disadvantaged people into the hierarchal structure 
of the attorney-client relationship—which does not challenge 
existing institutional distributions of power and privilege, but 
instead, reproduces those same oppressive systems and power 
relations—only leaves clients powerless and dependent.60 
The collectivist approach to TLS, like some other strands of “cause 
lawyering,”61 is not easily squared with the progressing commitment 
to client story and autonomy.
62
 As developed by its adherents, the 
collectivist TLS model appears to privilege the lawyers’ view of a 
proper business model and an effective organizational orientation—
that is, a collectivist, cooperative enterprise connecting as many 
community members as possible.
63
 The model implies, if it does not 
state outright, that in counseling a client about a choice of entity, a 
progressive TLS lawyer ought to encourage the formation of a 
worker cooperative instead of a traditional corporation or LLC.
64
 The 
 
 59. See supra notes 28–29 and accompanying text. Writing about the lawyering 
approaches to resolving disputes faced by poor clients, Ascanio Piomelli observes that the 
“most significant common theme” of this movement “is its commitment to more active client 
participation in the framing and resolution of disputes” with “active collaboration between 
attorneys and clients.” Piomelli, supra note 31, at 440. 
 60. Reyna Ramolete Hayashi, Empowering Domestic Workers Through Law and 
Organizing Initiatives, 9 SEATTLE J. FOR SOC. JUST. 487 (2010).  
 61. See CAUSE LAWYERING: POLITICAL COMMITMENTS AND PROFESSIONAL 
RESPONSIBILITIES (Austin Sarat & Stuart Scheingold eds., 1998); Anna-Maria Marshall & 
Daniel Crocker Hale, Cause Lawyering, 10 ANN. REV. L. & SOC. SCI. 301, 307–08 (2014); 
Scott Barclay & Daniel Chomsky, How Do Cause Lawyers Decide When and Where to Litigate 
on Behalf of Their Cause?, 48 LAW & SOC’Y REV. 595, 597–606 (2014); Deborah J. Cantrell, 
Sensational Reports: The Ethical Duty of Cause Lawyers to Be Competent in Public Advocacy, 
30 HAMLINE L. REV. 567, 569–71 (2007). 
 62. See Ann Southworth, Representing Agents of Community Economic Development: A 
Comment on Recent Trends, 8 J. SMALL & EMERGING BUS. L. 261, 271–72 (2004). 
 63. Rashmi Dyal-Chand and Jim Rowan acknowledge the conflict the activist lawyer 
encounters in proposing collectivist TLS protecting worker rights while working with the 
founders of a business. Dyal-Chand & Rowan, supra note 38, at 849–50. 
 64. See, e.g., Huertas-Noble, supra note 50; Krishna, supra note 57.  
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motives in doing so are honorable, of course, especially given the 
data about what measures work to achieve CED and the choice to 
allocate the scarce lawyer resources toward that achievement. And 
many cause lawyering advocates in fact downplay client preference if 
more effective mobilization strategies are available.
65
 If it is true that 
many low-income prospective clients would prefer a more 
individualized model of business ownership, the progressive TLS 
model cannot honor those preferences.
66
 
The collectivist proponents would point out that theirs is an 
orientation about one’s choice of clients and application of scarce 
resources, and less about persuading clients to pursue aims favored 
by the lawyers.
67
 In other words, in evaluating a TLS strategy through 
an access-to-justice lens, the collectivist stance simply holds that it is 
better to choose to represent collectives rather than individual 
entrepreneurs and to establish worker cooperatives instead of 
individual LLCs or Subchapter S corporations.  
If that is the collectivist stance, it is coherent and sensible, and 
true to the social justice commitment. But that view of the stance 
assumes that certain selected clients come to the lawyers asking for 
worker cooperatives, and the world may be much more fluid and 
ambiguous than that. Much of the collectivist literature supports a 
 
 65. See, e.g., Peter M. Cicchino, To Be a Political Lawyer, 31 HARV. C.R.-C.L. L. REV. 
311 (1996) (arguing that clients may not know best because of false consciousness); Kevin 
Johnson, Lawyering for Social Change: What’s a Lawyer to Do?, 5 MICH. J. RACE & L. 201, 
206 (1999–2000) (“[An] attorney’s professional responsibilities to clients, specifically to 
zealously represent one’s clients within the bounds of the law, limit his or her power to proceed 
independently on a path seeking true social transformation.”); William H. Simon, The Dark 
Secret of Progressive Lawyering: A Comment on Poverty Law Scholarship in the Post-Modern, 
Post-Reagan Era, 48 U. MIAMI L. REV. 1099, 1102 (1994) (“The Dark Secret of Progressive 
Lawyering is that effective lawyers cannot avoid making judgments in terms of their own 
values and influencing their clients to adopt those judgments.”). 
 66. This tension within progressive lawyering has not gone unnoticed in more traditional 
representational contexts. See, e.g., Cathy Lesser Mansfield, Deconstructing Reconstructive 
Poverty Law: Practice-Based Critique of the Storytelling Aspects of the Theoretics of Practice 
Movement, 61 BROOK. L. REV. 889 (1995); Southworth, supra note 62; Paul R. Tremblay, A 
Tragic View of Poverty Law Practice, 1 D.C. L. REV. 123 (1992). 
 67. Gary Bellow & Jeanne Kettleson, From Ethics to Politics: Confronting Scarcity and 
Fairness in Public Interest Practice, 58 B.U. L. REV. 337, 343–44 (1978) (offering justification 
for case, issue, and client selection and denial based on the goals of the organization); W. 
Bradley Wendel, Institutional and Individual Justification in Legal Ethics: The Problem of 
Client Selection, 34 HOFSTRA L. REV. 987, 1028 (2006) (“lawyers have the de facto power to 
determine which rights are enforced” by which clients they choose to represent). 
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lawyer encouraging entrepreneurs from underserved neighborhoods 
to appreciate the benefits to the community of less individualistic 
business schemes. If that is true, it also may be coherent and sensible, 
but it tends to conflict with the deep commitment to client narrative.
68
 
Of course, the stance leaves the energetic software app developer 
who wants to be as successful as possible without the free legal 
services that she needs to get there.
69
  
 
 68. Laura Notess, Preserving the Human in Human Rights: Incorporating Informed 
Consent into the Work of International Human Rights NGOs, 27 GEO. J. LEGAL ETHICS 765, 
776 (2014) (“[L]ike other cause lawyers, poverty lawyers frequently encounter tensions 
between the wishes of their client and the broader social change they wish to advocate for.”); 
see also Thomas M. Hilbink, You Know the Type . . . : Categories of Cause Lawyering, 29 LAW 
& SOC. INQUIRY, 657, 693 (2004) (“Law reform was made difficult by the fact that it was often 
difficult for lawyers to convince clients to hold out through the long process of precedent-
setting litigation and appeal, when in contrast, settlement offered immediate and much-needed 
results.”); Stephen Ellmann, Client-Centeredness Multiplied: Individual Autonomy and 
Collective Mobilization in Public Interest Lawyers’ Representation of Groups, 78 VA. L. REV. 
1103 (1992).  
 69. The other complication emerging from the arguments supporting collectivist TLS 
relates to the role that the lawyer’s expertise plays in her relationship with her client. It seems 
that in TLS settings, including collectivist TLS, the availability of the lawyer’s technical 
expertise is both more essential and less damaging than some critics, writing typically about 
dispute resolution contexts, have feared. Much progressive lawyering literature downplays 
lawyer expertise, emphasizing the dangers of the privileging of lawyers’ professional visions 
over more meaningful client narratives. See López, supra note 28 (describing the benefits 
stemming from the combination of problem-solving and persuasive storytelling); see also 
Alfieri, Reconstructive Poverty Law Practice, supra note 23 (“When the client’s voices are 
silenced and her narratives are displaced by the lawyer’s narratives, client integrity is tarnished 
and client story is lost. The intent of this Essay is to understand and rectify the loss of client 
narratives in lawyer storytelling.”); Anthony V. Alfieri, Speaking Out of Turn: The Story of 
Josephine V., 4 GEO. J. LEGAL ETHICS 619, 620–26 (1991) (noting the critical role of client 
voice); Juliet M. Brodie, Little Cases on the Middle Ground: Teaching Social Justice 
Lawyering in Neighborhood-Based Community Lawyering Clinics, 15 CLINICAL L. REV. 333, 
375–77 (2009) (describing “the Lawyer Domination Problem” and the benefits of 
neighborhood-based community lawyering); Clark D. Cunningham, The Lawyer as Translator, 
Representation as Text: Towards an Ethnography of Legal Discourse, 77 CORNELL L. REV. 
1298 (1992) (discussing the role of the lawyer as a “translator” for clients in the legal system); 
Binny Miller, Telling Stories About Cases and Clients: The Ethics of Narrative, 14 GEO. J. 
LEGAL ETHICS 1, 3 (2000) (criticizing the trend in legal scholarships to tell a client’s story 
without her input); Miller, Recognizing Client Narrative, supra note 24 (the traditional “notion 
of case theory ignores context and misconceives the power of important facts—especially the 
client’s life facts”); Lucie E. White, Collaborative Lawyering in the Field? On Mapping the 
Paths from Rhetoric to Practice, 1 CLINICAL L. REV. 157 (1994) (incorporating the client and 
her story into the lawyering process); White, Mrs. G, supra note 23 (exploring the strategic 
divide between telling the lived story and the legal story). In TLS settings, however, the 
businesses, whether collective or individual, often need precisely the lawyer’s technical 
expertise in order to sustain their enterprises. See Southworth, supra note 62, at 263–64. 
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D. An Alternative Access-to-Justice Lens: The Triage Analysis 
The exploration thus far has led us to the conclusion that if we 
evaluate TLS through the benchmark of access-to-justice, and if we 
understand access-to-justice as essentially a CED consideration, 
through its poverty-attacking strategy, then entrepreneurial TLS fares 
far less well than more progressive collectivist TLS. There is, though, 
another way to use the access-to-justice lens to assess entrepreneurial 
TLS. That lens is triage. The triage principle within ethical thought 
holds that scarce resources should be used in ways that achieve one’s 
goals most effectively.
70
 That principle may be applied to choices 
about delivery of entrepreneurial TLS. 
There is little question that the Civil Gideon movement’s 
litigation-focused strategies fare well under the access-to-justice 
(ATJ) benchmark. Indeed, the calls for greater availability for 
unrepresented litigants are always presented in terms of ATJ, so 
much so that the concepts are close to identical.
71
 But that ATJ 
conception is quite different from a CED conception. Few ATJ 
proponents argue that Civil Gideon is a long-term, poverty-fighting 
strategy. The press for more lawyers for unrepresented litigants is 
instead aimed to confront the immediate, short-term crisis of 
individuals and families in distress. While observers have commented 
with regularity about the limited social change capacity of LLS,
72
 few 
if any have argued that LLS is a bad thing, and not a justified use of 
the resources available to legal services organizations, law firms, and 
 
 70. See GEORGE WINSLOW, TRIAGE AND JUSTICE (1982). 
 71. A Westlaw search for the phrases “Civil Gideon” and “access to justice” produces 307 
sources that contain both references. For an example of the connection, see Rebecca Aviel, Why 
Civil Gideon Won’t Fix Family Law, 122 YALE L.J. 2106 (2013); Benjamin H. Barton & 
Stephanos Bibas, Triaging Appointed-Counsel Funding and Pro Se Access to Justice, 160 U. 
PA. L. REV. 967, 970 (2012); Russell Engler, Toward a Context-Based Civil Right to Counsel 
Through “Access to Justice” Initiatives, 40 CLEARINGHOUSE REV. 196 (2006); Stan Keillor, 
James H. Cohen & Mercy Changwesha, The Inevitable, If Untrumpeted, March Toward “Civil 
Gideon,” 64 SYRACUSE L. REV. 469 (2014). While the Civil Gideon movement is directly 
concerned with access to justice, not all of the participants agree that a civil right to counsel is 
an effective vehicle through which to achieve better access to more effective justice for more 
individuals. See, e.g., Barton & Bibas, supra (disagreeing that a right to counsel for categorical 
civil matters is the best use of scarce legal capital); Charn, supra note 10, at 2217 (supporting 
better pro se assistance models as more effective than a civil right to counsel). 
 72. For a review of those arguments, see Sharpless, supra note 6. 
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NGOs.
73
 Most critics will agree that the progressive legal 
establishment should combine attention to those in need now without 
forgetting the need to effect some long-term change—and to establish 
capital and power within communities lacking both. 
Given that, how does entrepreneurial TLS fare when compared to 
individualized LLS? To understand that inquiry, it is important to 
recognize that a justified Civil Gideon or LLS strategy must 
incorporate a triage component—that is, any plan for using the 
available scarce legal resources must include an assessment of the 
most effective use of those resources.
74
 As David Luban wrote many 
years ago, a legal aid office will justifiably turn down a prospective 
client who has a legitimate dispute with a department store over its 
failure to honor his dryer warranty in order to assist a client facing 
the loss of a home or a stream of income.
75
 The question confronted 
here is how a similar choice between an entrepreneur and a litigant 
with an otherwise high-priority legal services matter ought to be 
assessed. 
This question may be considered with two separate comparisons. 
Imagine that an overburdened, under-resourced community legal 
services organization has room for one new client, and only one new 
client.
76
 Two possible opportunities present themselves: 
Mithra Garcia is forty-four years old, an immigrant from 
Central America, living with her eighteen year-old son in a 
small apartment nearby. She works part-time at the Dollar 
Store in the next town, and her son receives SSI benefits. The 
 
 73. One observer who comes close to asserting that individual representation is more 
harmful than no representation is Steven Wexler in his seminal article about poverty lawyering. 
See Stephen Wexler, Practicing Law for Poor People, 79 YALE L.J. 1049 (1970). 
 74. Barton & Bibas, supra note 72, at 980–81; Cohen, supra note 13, at 244–45; 
Tremblay, Triage, supra note 13, at 2479–82. 
 75. LUBAN, supra note 19, at 309 (defending a principled triage and suggesting that a 
lottery or a queue would give equal opportunity to a woman facing court-sanctioned 
sterilization as a woman in dispute with Montgomery Ward over the store’s failure to honor her 
clothes dryer warranty). 
 76. At the symposium discussion at Washington University, some participants suggested 
that the organization squeeze in one more client and take both of these applicants. While that of 
course may be a realistic possibility in some settings, it sidesteps the critical question that must 
be addressed here. Given that organizational resources are finite, at some point some final “in or 
out” decisions must be made. See Paul R. Tremblay, Toward a Community-Based Ethic for 
Legal Services Practice, 37 UCLA L. REV. 1101 (1990). 
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father of her son has stopped paying the weekly child support 
ordered by the county family court. He claims he has lost his 
job, but Ms, Garcia is quite sure that some investigation will 
show that he has been working under the table. She asks for 
legal help to enforce the child support order. 
Netia Lee is a twenty-six year-old African-American woman 
who grew up in the high-poverty neighborhood where your 
office sits, and then graduated from the local community 
college with a degree in software engineering. Ms. Lee has an 
exciting new business project she has developed, a mobile 
phone app that lets its users efficiently and effectively manage 
emails. The business plan is promising and with a little more 
help she could possibly attract investors. She wants your help 
to register a trademark for the app and to establish a 
Subchapter C corporation (or similar entity) through which she 
can manage the business.
77
 
There is no question that in a typical neighborhood legal services 
office Ms. Garcia would be eligible for free legal services and Ms. 
Lee would not.
78
 But is that necessarily a sensible policy preference? 
Perhaps, the question is closer than one might initially conclude.
79
 
The goal of each representation would be to establish a reliable 
income stream for a person who does not yet have an adequate means 
of support. The arguments for assisting Ms. Garcia would include the 
fact that she is presumably more unsophisticated than Ms. Lee and 
would have a more difficult time without counsel navigating the 
family court processes and, importantly, developing the admissible 
evidence to prove that the obligor is indeed working when he claims 
he is not. Ms. Lee, with her better education and familiarity with the 
business world, has more resources available to her. Additionally, 
 
 77. While both of these examples are fictional, the entrepreneur described here is not 
dissimilar from a client represented by a pro bono lawyer and offered as an example of creative 
contemporary TLS. See Terry Carter, Grassroots Growth, 86 A.B.A. J. 25 (2000) (describing a 
corporate lawyer’s pro bono entrepreneurial client). 
 78. See, e.g., Cohen, supra note 13, at 227–33 (describing Connecticut Legal Services’ 
case selection priorities, which are typical of neighborhood legal service organizations). 
 79. For purposes of this thought experiment, assume (most likely counter-factually) that 
the organization has expertise in both areas, and (less counter-factually) that no pro bono lawyer 
is available to take the matter that the legal services office turns away. 
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Ms. Garcia is “stuck” more than Ms. Lee; she has fewer life choices, 
whereas Ms. Lee could, given her skills and her education, earn a 
living in some other way. 
But other arguments favor accepting Ms. Lee’s matter. She needs 
a lawyer just as much as Ms. Garcia, notwithstanding her greater 
education. It is not terribly speculative to assert that without access to 
free legal counsel her business—and her hoped-for income stream—
has a lower chance of succeeding.
80
 Indeed, Ms. Lee may need to 
speak with a lawyer for that guidance more than Ms. Garcia, oddly 
enough. Litigants in family and housing courts do have some, if not 
perfectly adequate, access to legal advice, since clerks review papers, 
judges ask questions, and proceedings are controlled by precedent.
81
 
Participants in transactions do not have any similar forum, aside from 
on-line services like LegalZoom, which is not free and whose 
reliability is not entirely assured.
82
 Further, the goals of representing 
Ms. Lee are equally desirable as those of representing Ms. Garcia. 
Success in either endeavor would provide the client with a good 
chance of a sustainable income stream. A successful business not 
only provides that client with capital and economic power; it might 
 
 80. See Abraham J.B. Cable, Startup Lawyers at the Outskirts, 50 WILLAMETTE L. REV. 
163, 167–69 (2014); Viktor Mayer-Schönberger, The Law as Stimulus: The Role of Law in 
Fostering Innovative Entrepreneurship, 6 I/S: J. L. & POL’Y FOR INFO. SOC’Y 153, 175–81 
(2010); SEAN M. O’CONNOR, HOW TO BUILD IPR-FOCUSED ENTREPRENEURIAL LAW & 
BUSINESS CLINICS TO ASSIST REGIONAL ECONOMIC DEVELOPMENT AROUND THE GLOBE 5 
(Int’l Intellectual Prop. Inst. 2008), available at http://iipi.org/wp-content/uploads/2010/07/ 
How_to_Build_IP-Focused_Law_Clinics.pdf (last visited May 20, 2015) (microentrepreneurs 
who receive technical assistance appear to have greater business creation, survival and growth 
rates). 
 81. See Russell Engler, And Justice for All—Including the Unrepresented Poor: Revisiting 
the Roles of the Judges, Mediators, and Clerks, 67 FORDHAM L. REV. 1987 (1999); Russell G. 
Pearce, Redressing Inequality in the Market for Justice: Why Access to Lawyers Will Never 
Solve the Problem and Why Rethinking the Role of Judges Will Help, 73 FORDHAM L. REV. 
969, 977 (2004). 
 82. See Benjamin P. Cooper, Access to Justice Without Lawyers, 47 AKRON L. REV. 205, 
211 (2014) (noting that LegalZoom’s effectiveness has not yet been proven); Robert R. 
Statchen, Clinicians, Practitioners, and Scribes: Drafting Client Work Product in a Small 
Business Clinic, 56 N.Y.L. SCH. L. REV. 233, 254 (2011) (most clients who have used 
LegalZoom need assistance to correct or refine the documents received). Anecdotally, one hears 
many stories about business founders using software programs to create documents that do not 
effectively satisfy the required governance or regulatory elements.  
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even have ripple effects, such as employment of others to assist in the 
business.
83
 
The point to be noted here is that providing legal assistance to an 
entrepreneur might accomplish the well-established goal of income 
maintenance as well as, if not better than, offering legal services to a 
more typical legal services client, such as an individual seeking child 
support or SSI benefits. That conclusion is not undercut by the 
entrepreneur’s express desire for wealth maximization. 
What if the choice were between Ms. Lee and a client whose need 
is not an income stream? The choice between Ms. Garcia and Ms. 
Lee is seemingly comparable and not incommensurate, since both 
prospective clients need income and the lawyer’s goal would be to 
obtain that income. What if the choice were between developing a 
business and preventing or ameliorating a tragic and painful state of 
affairs? This question invites a new hypothetical client to compare to 
the Lee representation: 
Robert Johnson is a thirty-three year-old veteran of the first 
Gulf War. He suffers from symptoms of PTSD and as a result 
has had considerable difficulty holding a job. He qualified for 
Social Security disability benefits which serve as his only 
source of income. Fortunately, he has managed to lease a 
public housing unit whose rent will always be calculated based 
on his income, and therefore is close to affordable.
84
 He now 
faces eviction, and comes to the legal services office with court 
papers. The local police arrested his girlfriend for possession 
of cocaine while visiting his apartment, and federal law states 
that he may lose his housing rights as a result.
85
 A tenant who 
is evicted for cause from public housing is typically barred 
 
 83. Many commentators note the critical importance of assets and capital in overcoming 
poverty. See, e.g., Patience A. Crowder, Inequality, Economic Development, and the New 
Regional Community, 43 SW. L. REV. 569, 584 (2014); Vada Waters Lindsey, Encouraging 
Savings Under the Earned Income Tax Credit: A Nudge in the Right Direction, 44 U. MICH. 
J.L. REFORM 83 (2010). 
 84. The federal public housing laws tie rent to income. Housing and Urban Development 
Act of 1969 (Brooke Amendment), Pub. L. No. 91-152, § 213, 83 Stat. 379, 389 (1969) 
(codified as amended at 12 U.S.C. § 1715z-1a). 
 85. See Dep’t of Hous. & Urban Dev. v. Rucker, 535 U.S. 125 (2002) (public housing 
authorities can “evict tenants for the drug-related activity of household members and guests 
whether or not the tenant knew, or should have known, about the activity”). 
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from applying for public housing for a long time,
86
 so losing 
this court matter means likely homelessness for Mr. Johnson. 
Let us also assume that a trained housing lawyer might develop 
a potentially successful defense to this action. 
If the choice for the hypothetical legal services office, which has the 
time to accept only one new client project, is between Ms. Lee and 
Mr. Johnson, are there any reasons for that lawyer, or her 
organization, to choose to represent Ms. Lee, the entrepreneur? This 
is a harder call, to be sure, and the values at stake are less 
commensurate than in the previous example. A careful triage 
analysis, applying the principle that the organization ought to address 
the most serious and urgent matters before less serious and less 
urgent ones,
87
 would appear to favor Mr. Johnson given the 
immediate difficulties he faces. If so, perhaps the lesson to be drawn 
is that an organization might treat entrepreneurial requests as 
somewhat comparable to those requests for income maintenance, but 
not to requests for assistance with evictions or similarly compelling 
plights. But even that triage analysis may prove too much. As long as 
the programmatic goals of the legal services organization include 
long-term capital development and empowerment strategies, cases 
like that of Mr. Johnson might be deferred in favor of that long-term 
goal to effect broader change.
88
 And, if the organization embraces a 
mix of urgent-triage and longer-term power, the factors favoring Ms. 
Lee might make this choice not as one-sided as it originally appeared.  
 
 86. An eviction from public housing is a serious negative consideration in a later 
application for subsidized housing. See 24 C.F.R. § 960.203 (2014) (Standards for PHA tenant 
selection criteria); U.S. DEP’T OF HOUS. & URBAN DEV., PUBLIC HOUSING OCCUPANCY 
GUIDEBOOK 54 (2003), available at http://www.hud.gov/offices/pih/programs/ph/rhiip/phguide 
booknew.pdf. 
 87. Cohen, supra note 13, at 247–54; Tremblay, Triage, supra note 13, at 2492. 
 88. While legal services organizations struggle under the crushing burden of immediate 
needs, many include long-term transactional empowerment components. See, e.g., Zenobia Lai 
et al., The Lessons of the Parcel C Struggle: Reflections on Community Lawyering, 6 ASIAN 
PAC. AM. L.J. 1, 2 (2000) (describing efforts of attorneys at Greater Boston Legal Services to 
effect important change through community lawyering). 
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E. A Summary of the Foregoing Discussion 
The above discussion suggests the following imperfect and 
tentative conclusions: if the value or justification of TLS is assessed 
using an empowerment, community-building standard, the 
ecumenical, entrepreneurial TLS is rather difficult to defend. While 
ecumenical, entrepreneurial TLS will likely help individual 
entrepreneurs and spur some isolated economic development, that 
strategy appears not to accomplish a sufficient social justice mission 
when compared to a more collectivist, community-building version 
of TLS. But if the value or justification of TLS is assessed using an 
access-to-justice lens, then the issue is a closer one. While most 
access-to-justice strategies incorporate, implicitly or otherwise, a 
triage analysis in their campaigns for more lawyers for litigants, some 
of those arguments will support dedication of legal resources to 
individual, entrepreneurial TLS, especially if the entrepreneur has 
connections to communities that have traditionally been underserved 
or distressed. 
III. ALTERNATIVE, CONTEXT-SPECIFIC JUSTIFICATIONS FOR 
ENTREPRENEURIAL TLS 
The discussion thus far has addressed the question of the best use 
of scarce legal resources if the choice were between ordinary 
litigation-directed help for low-income persons in disputes and 
transactional help for an entrepreneurial individual aiming to start a 
successful small business. That discussion assumed very little context 
aside from the availability of free lawyer time and prospective clients 
with differing goals and legal needs. Part III of this Article considers 
context, recognizing that the setting and the available choices might 
really matter. It addresses three identifiable sources of free legal help, 
to explore whether the specific context and role responsibilities might 
change one’s assessment of the justification for using scarce legal 
resources for entrepreneurship. Those three contexts are law firm pro 
bono, law school clinics, and public interest law firms. 
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A. Law Firm Pro Bono 
Providing free legal services to persons who cannot access 
counsel is the responsibility of every lawyer and, while not mandated 
by the American Bar Association or by many states,
89
 is energetically 
encouraged across the country.
90
 Established law firms, particularly 
larger national or international firms, engage in significant pro bono 
efforts
91
 and enjoy the reputational benefits of doing so.
92
 As pro 
bono administrators at law firms choose where to allocate their 
available legal talent and time, they encounter the same questions 
addressed here—is TLS a justifiable commitment by the firms? In 
this respect, law firms are a ready laboratory in which to test some of 
the ideas developed above. 
To put the law firm pro bono question in proper context, one must 
first explore and clarify, at least in brief fashion, the normative 
qualities of the choice that lawyers face in providing pro bono legal 
services.
93
 The legal profession’s pro bono commitment is grounded 
 
 89. See MODEL RULES OF PROF’L CONDUCT R. 6.1 (2014) (recommending, but not 
requiring, lawyers to provide fifty hours per year of pro bono legal services). Most states follow 
the Model Rule’s policy of not requiring pro bono. See STANDING COMM. ON PRO BONO & 
PUB. SERV. & THE CTR. FOR PRO BONO, STATE REPORTING POLICIES, Am. Bar, available at 
http://apps.americanbar.org/legalservices/probono/reporting/pbreporting.html (last visited Apr. 
8, 2015).  New York recently instituted a requirement that applicants to the New York bar 
perform fifty hours of pro bono service before admission. See N.Y. COMP. CODES R. & REGS. 
tit. 22, § 520.16 (2015). 
 90. Several states require attorneys to report their pro bono activity annually as a 
condition of licensure, including Florida, Hawaii, Illinois, Indiana, Maryland, Mississippi, 
Nevada, and New Mexico. See STANDING COMM. ON PRO BONO & PUB. SERV. & THE CTR. 
FOR PRO BONO, supra note 89. 
 91. The American Lawyer, a leading legal news source, annually releases a list of the 200 
highest-grossing firms ranked by pro bono performance performed by United States-based 
lawyers. Criteria include the average number of pro bono hours performed by lawyers and the 
percentage of lawyers contributing at least twenty hours of pro bono work. See THE AM. 
LAWYER, NATIONAL PRO BONO RANKINGS 56 (2014), available at http://www.american 
lawyer.com/id=1202660999888/National-Pro-Bono-Rankings?slreturn=20150013203410 (last 
visited Jan. 13, 2015). 
 92. Law firms consider their reputation of pro bono to be an important recruitment asset. 
See Darhiana Mateo, Pro Bono, Transactional Style, 15 A.B.A. J. 2 (2005); Cummings, supra 
note 2, at 107–15 (describing the “business case” for pro bono at large firms); Scott L. 
Cummings & Deborah L. Rhode, Managing Pro Bono: Doing Well by Doing Better, 78 
FORDHAM L. REV. 2357, 2371–72 (2010) (describing the AmLaw rankings). 
 93. See Morsch, supra note 2 (describing the reasons for transactional lawyers to engage 
in this enterprise). 
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in the stark realization that legal services are both essential and 
expensive.
94
 Persons who cannot afford lawyers cannot exercise the 
rights to which the law entitles them, and lawyers, who benefit from 
the monopoly the state provides to them to deliver these necessary 
services, shoulder an ethical responsibility to help overcome the 
effects of the scarcity of this needed good.
95
 Therefore, the profession 
encourages lawyers to provide pro bono that matters. Lawyers may 
always agree not to charge a client for services, for whatever reasons 
the lawyer may have. But to “count” as pro bono, and to respond to 
the ethical responsibility, the pro bono offerings must address the 
underlying need for the legal assistance.
96
 In this way, a lawyer’s 
decision about whom to represent for free in response to the ethical 
responsibility will implicate the same questions this Article has 
attempted to address. 
If that analysis follows, then law firm pro bono committees ought 
to consider the arguments and considerations developed above in 
deciding whom to represent for free.
97
 It may appear that nothing 
about the law firm terrain alters or complicates what we encountered 
earlier in our assessment of the justification of entrepreneurial TLS. 
But that may not be the case. It may be that a law firm pro bono 
committee has reasons to view entrepreneurial TLS more favorably 
than a hypothetical funder with dollars to spend on whatever legal 
services ought to receive them. The difference is in the available 
expertise and the incentives to offer the free legal services. 
The arguments above provide relatively weak justification for a 
law firm pro bono committee to include entrepreneurial TLS in its 
mix of pro bono—particularly ecumenical, entrepreneurial TLS. 
However, better justifications do exist for law firms with corporate, 
 
 94. See, e.g., LEGAL SERVICES, DOCUMENTING THE JUSTICE GAP IN AMERICA (2009); 
Elena Romerdahl, The Shame of the Legal Profession: Why Eighty Percent of Those in Need of 
Civil Legal Assistance Do Not Receive It and What We Should Do About It, 22 GEO. J. LEGAL 
ETHICS 1115, 1117–18 (2009). 
 95. Cummings, supra note 2. 
 96. LEGAL SERVICES CORP., REPORT OF THE PRO BONO TASK FORCE, at 5 (2012), 
available at http://www.lsc.gov/sites/default/files/LSC/lscgov4/PBTF_%20Report_FINAL.pdf; 
Roberts, supra note 9, at 352. 
 97. See Cohen, supra note 13, at 223 n.4 (describing that pro bono departments ought to 
use different selection criteria than legal services organizations given the absence of any formal 
commitment to engage in charitable activity). 
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intellectual property, and tax departments, with specialists in each. 
For a law firm offering only litigation legal services, this reasoning 
will apply less well, but, since most, if not all, regional, national, and 
international law firms have such transactional departments, the 
following observations, if sound, would have broad reach. 
Assume that a law firm wishes to encourage as much pro bono as 
possible, and wants any such pro bono to be effective. If the firm 
focuses primarily on LLS, and responds to the powerful Civil Gideon 
stories of unrepresented litigants facing significant challenges in 
court, it will have a harder time persuading its non-litigation lawyers 
to join in. Not an impossible task, to be sure, and stories abound of 
corporate lawyers appearing on behalf of a low-income client in 
family or housing court, or at an immigration hearing, and learning a 
great deal as a result.
98
 There are also poignant stories in which a 
litigant in a busy urban court represented by a less-than-experienced 
lawyer from a powerful law firm can achieve considerable benefit 
merely from that lawyer’s having shown up, even if the lawyer does 
not know much about the substance of that practice area.
99
 But asking 
corporate lawyers to handle evictions and immigration appeals seems 
not to be the best use of those lawyers’ expertise, and assuredly limits 
their willingness to volunteer.
100
 
 
 98. See, e.g., The Legal Aid Soc’y, LAS Volunteer Rebecca Berlow: Making the Law 
Accessible to People that Have Been Shut Out of Its Reach, PRO BONO NET (Mar. 4, 2014), 
http://www.probono.net/ny/news/article.512680-LAS_Volunteer_Rebecca_Berlow_Making_the 
_Law_Accessible_to_People_that_Have (last visited May 20, 2015) (securities lawyer); Adiyah 
Ali, Mayer Brown Attorney Helps Boy Who Was Abused, Abandoned and Neglected, KIDS IN 
NEED OF DEF. (2012), http://supportkind.org/stories/james-clegg/ (last visited May 20, 
2015) (tax lawyer). See also Lynnise Pantin, “You Are Not Lawyering Unless You Are 
Litigating”: Integrating Social Justice and the Transactional Law Clinic to Debunk This Fiction 
(Sept. 1, 2009) (unpublished manuscript) (on file with author) (describing her experience with 
pro bono litigation work while a corporate lawyer at the law firm Debevoise & Plimpton). 
 99. See Steven Lubet, Professionalism Revisited, 42 EMORY L.J. 197, 206–07 (1993), in 
CLINICAL ANTHOLOGY: READINGS FOR LIVE CLIENT CLINICS 235–38 (Alex J. Hurder, Frank S. 
Bloch, Susan L. Brooks & Susan L. Kay eds., 2d ed. 2011) (describing Albert Jenner of Jenner 
& Block appearing in a housing court in Chicago). 
 100. See STANDING COMM. ON PRO BONO & PUB. SERV. & THE CTR. FOR PRO BONO, 
STATE REPORTING POLICIES, Am. Bar, available at http://apps.americanbar.org/legalservices/ 
probono/corporate_counsel.html#barriers (“Corporate counsels traditionally possess business 
law and/or transactional skills, which may not be helpful to programs serving individual clients 
with bread and butter cases. Also, their background may make them hesitant to accept 
litigation-oriented matters[.]”) (last visited Apr. 8, 2015). 
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If the pro bono committee instead offers to represent 
entrepreneurs who cannot afford counsel, both of those problems are 
ameliorated. The firm takes the best advantage of the lawyers’ 
expertise, and the odds are good that more lawyers will participate. 
The universe of pro bono services will be larger, and the quality of 
the legal work higher. If the case for ecumenical entrepreneurial TLS 
is weak but still plausible, this factor ought to provide the kind of 
added weight to justify offering services to the entrepreneurs. Since 
the evidence that assisting those entrepreneurs who do not have a 
social mission but only have a wealth-accumulation goal is mixed on 
the question of how much social good that assistance accomplishes, 
this added positive factor may serve to justify the allocation of the 
scarce legal services to that type of client. This is especially true if, as 
seems likely, the universe of social venture entrepreneurs is 
somewhat limited, so that there is excess capacity of lawyers 
available to entrepreneurs above that needed by social entrepreneurs. 
However, the nonprofit organization most widely respected as an 
arbiter of what pro bono “counts” for larger law firms does not yet 
embrace this position. The Pro Bono Institute (PBI), a recognized 
authority on “what counts” as pro bono legal services,101 supports 
TLS as acceptable pro bono only in its most social-entrepreneurship 
or collectivist guise. PBI does not recognize hours dedicated to 
entrepreneurial TLS. In order for a legal service to count in its tally of 
firm pro bono efforts, PBI requires that the entrepreneurs and owners 
of the business be of limited means or that the business contribute to 
the public good: 
For-profit business ventures are rarely eligible for pro bono 
legal services. However, where the individuals behind the 
 
 101. PBI has established the Pro Bono Challenge, an initiative through which the most 
prominent firms in the nation strive to meet the goal of 3 percent of the firm’s annual billable 
hours (or 5 percent for the most ambitious firms) applied to the kinds of pro bono that PBI 
deems eligible to “count.” For a description of the challenge, see Law Firm Pro Bono 
Challenge, PRO BONO INST., http://www.probonoinst.org/projects/law-firm-pro-bono/law-firm-
pro-bono-challenge/ (last visited May 20, 2015). Nearly 150 of the largest firms participate in 
the challenge. For a list of the firms currently participating, see Law Firm Pro Bono Challenge 
Signatories List, PRO BONO INST., http://www.probonoinst.org/projects/law-firm-pro-bono/law-
firm-pro-bono-challenge-signatory-law-firms/law-firm-pro-bono-challenge-signatories-list/ (last 
visited May 20, 2015). The American Lawyer magazine’s annual ranking of law firm pro bono 
efforts uses the PBI standards as its metric. See Rhode & Cummings, supra note 92. 
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venture themselves would be eligible for pro bono legal 
services or where the venture benefits society and is the 
functional equivalent of a non-profit, the for-profit business 
could be eligible for pro bono legal services associated with 
that venture.
102
 
Conventional small businesses without a social mission will not 
qualify under the PBI standards. Metrowest Worker Center would 
count; Drizly would not.
103
 Nor would the hypothetical client 
identified as Netia Lee in our earlier discussion.
104
 
The PBI criteria for what “counts,” with entrepreneurial TLS not 
satisfying that criteria, appear to be shared by other agencies and 
organizations monitoring pro bono efforts. For instance, in Illinois, as 
in several states, each member of the bar must report annually the 
number of pro bono hours he or she performed.
105
 Performing pro 
bono is not mandatory; reporting how much the lawyer offered is 
mandatory.
106
 Pro bono legal services that count for reporting 
purposes include legal services “without charge or expectation of a 
fee” (a) to a person of limited means; (b) to an organization 
“designed to address the needs of persons of limited means”; (c) to 
certain “charitable, religious, civic, or community organizations”; and 
(d) pro bono “training intended to benefit legal service organizations 
or lawyers who provide pro bono services.”107 The rule explains that 
“persons of limited means” include the “working poor” along with 
those who have even less income.
108
 The literal reading of the rule 
 
 102. PRO BONO INSTITUTE, LAW FIRM PRO BONO CHALLENGE COMMENTARY TO 
STATEMENT OF PRINCIPLES (2015) [hereinafter PRO BONO CHALLENGE COMMENTARY], 
available at http://www.probonoinst.org/wpps/wp-content/uploads/Law-Firm-Challenge-
Commentary-20151.pdf (last visited Oct. 24, 2014) (Commentary to Principle 7) (emphasis 
added). 
 103. See supra text accompanying note 36.  
 104. See supra text accompanying note 77. 
 105. Ill. Sup. Ct. R. 756(f). 
 106. Id. Commentators have argued that requiring reporting of pro bono work is more 
effective than mandating pro bono service itself. See, e.g., Lisa Boyle, Meeting the Demands of 
the Indigent Population: The Choice Between Mandatory and Voluntary Pro Bono 
Requirements, 20 GEO. J. LEGAL ETHICS 415, 415 (2007). 
 107. Ill. Sup. Ct. R. 756(f)(1) (requiring all attorneys licensed in Illinois to report, in 
connection with the attorney’s annual registration, pro bono legal services provided and 
qualified monetary contributions made during the preceding twelve months). 
 108. Id. at 756(f)(2). 
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would arguably allow “countable” pro bono for entrepreneurial legal 
services if the entrepreneur were a low-income individual, but not for 
a business entity unless it were a nonprofit. Such work for the low-
income individual entrepreneur does not appear to meet the spirit of 
the rule, however. Other states requiring the reporting of pro bono 
have similarly restrictive definitions.
109
 
Of course, a law firm may provide free legal services to 
entrepreneurs even if it cannot count the work for state or monitoring 
agency purposes, and even if that work does not help with the firm’s 
national ranking of its pro bono efforts.
110
 If the challenge the firm 
encounters is whether that use of its available free legal services is 
justified, the above analysis should offer some justification for 
assisting entrepreneurs, especially those from underserved 
neighborhoods or backgrounds. If the challenge is how to incentivize 
the firm to do so, then the states or monitoring agencies will need to 
develop a broader definition of what counts. 
B. Law School Clinics 
Law school clinical programs, for many years dominated by 
litigation-driven poverty law offerings, now include at a substantial 
number of law schools some transactional or business clinics.
111
 
While many, and perhaps most, of those clinics are directly 
connected to social entrepreneurship and conventional CED work,
112
 
 
 109. See, e.g., MISS. R. PROF’L CONDUCT 6.1 (2015); NEV. R. PROF’L CONDUCT 6.1 
(2013). 
 110. The American Lawyer magazine annually ranks law firms by the extent of their 
countable pro bono efforts, using standards developed by PBI as discussed above. See supra 
note 91. For the 2014 rankings, see THE AM. LAWYER, PRO BONO: HOW DOES YOUR FIRM 
RATE? (2014), available at http://www.americanlawyer.com/id=1202608682486/Pro-Bono-
How-Does-Your-Firm-Rate (paid subscription required). 
 111. See Rebecca Sandefur & Jeffrey Selbin, The Clinic Effect, 16 CLINICAL L. REV. 57, 
85 (2009). The nonprofit Kauffman Foundation monitors and supports law school transactional 
clinics, and its website lists 127 law schools with 154 separate clinics available. See Law School 
Entrepreneurship Clinics, EWING MARION KAUFFMAN FOUNDATION (2015), 
http://www.entrepreneurship.org/entrepreneurship-law/law-school-entrepreneurship-clinics. aspx 
(last visited Jan. 10, 2015). 
 112. See, e.g., Community and Economic Development Clinic, THE UNIV. OF MICH. LAW 
SCH., http://www.law.umich.edu/clinical/CEDC/Pages/default.aspx; Social Enterprise and 
Nonprofit Clinic, GEORGETOWN LAW, http://www.law.georgetown.edu/academics/academic-
programs/clinical-programs/our-clinics/social-enterprise/index.cfm. 
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in recent years some law schools have innovated with courses serving 
private, profit-seeking entrepreneurial clients.
113
 Indeed, a few 
schools have begun to offer “live client” clinical courses114 on behalf 
of successful, established businesses that can easily afford private 
counsel, but accept representation by clinic students in order to assist 
with the pedagogical goals of the institutions (and, perhaps, to reduce 
legal bills a bit).
115
 
It is easy for a law school to defend clinic-generated TLS on 
behalf of social entrepreneurs and community groups. That defense is 
hardly different from the justification the school might offer to 
provide free legal services to victims of domestic violence, criminal 
defendants, tenants fearing eviction, etc.—the clients that are 
typically represented by litigation clinics. But the justification for 
offering free legal services to entrepreneurs, either those who cannot 
afford legal services, or those who can, requires different 
considerations. 
At a superficial level, law schools have a ready justification. The 
mission of a law school is to educate its students, and not all of its 
educational components must at the same time serve social justice 
goals.
116
 Unless one emasculates the conception of social justice, so 
that anything that makes for more effective practicing lawyers serves 
a social justice objective, law schools may justifiably offer courses 
and programs that are agnostic on the justice question. A truly 
effective Mergers and Acquisitions classroom course, to choose one 
 
 113. See, e.g., Law & Entrepreneurship Clinic, UNIV. OF WIS. LAW SCH., https://www. 
uwle.org; Entrepreneurship Legal Clinic, UNIV. OF PA. LAW SCH., https://www.law.upenn.edu/ 
clinic/entrepreneurship. 
 114. The term “live client” means that the work performed by the students as part of their 
educational curriculum consists of lawyering on behalf of actual clients who need that 
representational work, and not through simulations. See, e.g., Ann Juergens, Using the 
MacCrate Report to Strengthen Live-Client Clinics, 1 CLINICAL L. REV. 411, 411 n.2 (1994); 
Report of the Committee on the Future of the In-House Clinic, 42 J. LEGAL EDUC. 508 (1991). 
 115. For example, at the University of Michigan Law School, Professor Michael Bloom 
offers a “Transactional Lab” where students work with successful, large corporations. See 
Transactional Lab Course Description, MICHIGAN LAW, http://www.law.umich.edu/Current 
Students/Registration/ClassSchedule/Pages/AboutClass.aspx?term=2020&classnbr=10048 (last 
visited Jan. 10, 2015). The Kirkland & Ellis Corporate Lab at The University of Chicago Law 
School also undertakes project with major corporations such as Microsoft Corporation and 
Accenture. See http://www.law.uchicago.edu/corporatelab (last visited on May 20, 2015). 
 116. Praveen Kosuri, Losing My Religion: The Place of Social Justice in Clinical Legal 
Education, 32 B.C. J.L. & SOC. JUST. 331 (2012). 
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example, would ordinarily not be considered a component of an 
institution’s justice mission, but such a course would be deemed an 
essential component of a legal education curriculum. So, from that 
vantage point law schools, even more so than law firms, may defend 
providing entrepreneurial TLS because of its dual mission of 
educating law students while also contributing to social justice, if 
perhaps not always at the same time.
117
 
At a less superficial level, however, this inquiry is more 
complicated. Two arguments would discourage law schools from 
using client work unrelated to service to disadvantaged populations 
as a vehicle to teach their students. The first emerges from a claim 
that an essential mission of clinical legal education is to instill a sense 
of social justice in students, and therefore the work of clinics must 
address or confront injustice.
118
 As Jane Aiken writes, “Should clinics 
aim to teach students awareness of injustice and the role that lawyers 
play in fighting it? Or is that not an essential component of clinical 
legal education?”119 If so, then one might conclude from that premise 
that law school clinics ought to (or perhaps must) choose clients 
whose work advances the cause of justice. If entrepreneurial TLS 
unconnected to underserved communities does not advance justice, 
then, the argument proceeds, law schools ought not offer clinics 
whose work focuses on such ecumenical entrepreneurial TLS. 
That argument does not hold up in the end, even if one embraces 
its premises. There is no doubt that many within law schools would 
advocate clinics’ choosing transactional work on behalf of collectivist 
or CED clients, rather than entrepreneurial TLS. But the Aiken thesis, 
shared by others, makes a different point. Aiken argues that law 
schools must teach about justice, and that clinical work cannot avoid 
questions of justice, because, as she writes, “There is no such thing as 
neutrality; everything has just or unjust effects. Therefore, clinical 
 
 117. See Praveen Kosuri, “Impact” in 3D—Maximizing Impact Through Transactional 
Clinics, 18 CLINICAL L. REV. 1 (2011) (defending a model where pedagogy possesses at least 
as strong a role as social justice in a transactional business clinic). 
 118. Jane H. Aiken, The Clinical Mission of Justice Readiness, 32 B.C. J.L. & SOC. JUST. 
231, 231 (2012); Stephen Wizner & Jane Aiken, Teaching and Doing: The Role of Law School 
Clinics in Enhancing Access to Justice, 73 FORDHAM L. REV. 997, 997–98 (2004). 
 119. Aiken, supra note 117, at 231. 
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legal education cannot avoid dealing with justice.”120 Accepting her 
underlying assumptions as sound, a clinic focused on entrepreneurial 
TLS could accomplish the goals of teaching about entrepreneurship 
and, to the extent that all lawyering implicates power and justice 
concerns, also tease out from that entrepreneurial work those 
important lessons.
121
 The fact that some teachers may choose not to 
use entrepreneurial TLS as a vehicle to explore power and justice 
issues is a separate consideration for our purposes. 
The other argument we must confront focuses less on the 
pedagogy and more on the political, moral, or even legal implications 
of law schools—and here we are primarily, and perhaps only, 
considering nonprofit law schools—providing free legal services to 
persons who either are well-off, or hope to be well off if their 
businesses succeed. The political and moral aspects of that argument 
are weaker. Politically, it may not be wise for law schools to offer 
free legal services to businesses that might find representation in the 
private market, as alumni and other constituencies may object to the 
anticompetitive strategy of the institution. That fear is low, if only 
because so few clinics would accept clients that can reliably afford or 
retain in some fashion private counsel. That is not the worry with 
which this Article is attempting to wrestle. The moral question 
simply reprises the discussion that began this subsection, where this 
Article concluded that the educational mission of the law school will 
 
 120. Id. 
 121. Aiken argues both that clinical education inevitably invokes questions of justice, see 
id., and that the clinic’s choice of clients can affect critical thinking about power and justice, see 
id. at 242. She also tends to assume that clinics will represent poor persons, see id. at 242–43. 
Given her attention to client type, an ecumenical entrepreneurial TLS focus may not easily 
invite justice considerations. But other scholarship, including prior work by Aiken, affirms her 
assertion that the clinical experience itself, regardless of the clients served, may engage students 
in the justice mission if the teachers so choose. See Jane H. Aiken, Striving to Teach “Justice, 
Fairness and Morality,” 4 CLINICAL L. REV. 1, 10 (1997) (justice teaching involves being 
“explicit about how power operates, particularly in its subtle and invisible manifestations”); 
John C. Dubin, Clinical Design for Social Justice Imperatives, 51 SMU L. REV. 1461, 1477 
(1998) (clinical education furthers justice education “through the deconstruction of power and 
privilege in the law”). Other commentators, though, argue more directly that clinics, in order to 
achieve the necessary social justice mission, must work with disadvantaged clients on matters 
directly implicating subordination. See, e.g., Sameer Ashar, Law Clinics and Collective 
Mobilization, 14 CLINICAL L. REV. 355, 387 (2008) (“[c]ase-centered clinics . . . fail to serve 
political collectives”); Brodie, supra note 69, at 351 (community lawyering cases are the best 
vehicles to pursue a social justice agenda). 
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inevitably include training students to participate in wealth-
generating (and therefore weakly justified on a social justice scale) 
endeavors. 
The legal question for nonprofit law schools is somewhat more 
intriguing, but ultimately not a serious worry. All nonprofit 
organizations must engage “exclusively,”122 which to the Internal 
Revenue Service in fact means “primarily,”123 in activities deemed to 
be “charitable”124 in order to maintain their tax-exempt status. A 
nonprofit law school offering through its clinics free litigation-based 
legal services to poor clients risks nothing with the IRS, as that 
service qualifies as charitable
125
 and as educational,
126
 both exempt 
purposes. The potential worry about a nonprofit law school offering 
free entrepreneurial TLS is that those services may not qualify as 
“charitable,” and therefore a school may have a worry about 
maintaining its exempt status.
127
 A moment’s reflection shows that 
such a worry is entirely unfounded. 
Whether a nonprofit organization whose explicit mission was to 
assist profit-seeking entrepreneurs to become successful would 
qualify for tax-exempt status under Section 501(c)(3) is an interesting 
question.
128
 The IRS would almost assuredly approve of such a 
mission,
129
 but even if supporting private entrepreneurship were not 
 
 122. I.R.C. § 501(c)(3) (2012). 
 123. Treas. Reg. § 1.501(c)(3)-1(c)(1) (as amended in 2008) (providing that “[a]n 
organization will be regarded as ‘operated exclusively’ for one or more exempt purposes only if 
it engages primarily in activities which accomplish one or more of such exempt purposes”). 
 124. Treas. Reg. § 1.501(c)(3)-1(d)(1)(ii) (as amended in 2008). 
 125. The “charitable” element includes “[r]elief of the poor and distressed or of the 
underprivileged . . . .” Id. at (d)(2).  
 126. Id. at (d)(1)(i)(f). 
 127. Note that this question is separate from that of a law school operating a functioning 
law firm with paying clients, as some have urged. See Vincent D. Rougeau, Law schools should 
consider med-school model—a dean’s view, LEGAL REBELS (Mar. 13, 2013, 1:54 PM), 
http://www.abajournal.com/legalrebels/article/law_schools_should_consider_med-
school_model_--_a_deans_view/. For a discussion of that prospect, see Bradley T. Borden & 
Robert J. Rhee, Essay, The Law School Firm, 63 S.C. L. REV. 1 (2011). 
 128. See Matthew J. Rossman, Evaluating Trickle Down Charity: A Solution for 
Determining When Economic Development Aimed at Revitalizing America’s Cities and Regions 
Is Really Charitable, 79 BROOK. L. REV. 1455, 1457–61 (2014) (describing economic 
development organizations that have received IRS approval for tax-exemption under Section 
501(c)(3)). 
 129. For instance, the Ewing Marion Kauffman Foundation, a 501(c)(3) private foundation, 
is dedicated to encouraging and advancing entrepreneurship. See EWING MARION KAUFFMAN 
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deemed charitable standing alone, a law school could provide the 
same services without any risk to its exempt status. The IRS has 
declared that activities that on their own would not qualify for 
exemption may be permitted if those activities advance the mission of 
the exempt organization.
130
 The most common examples involve 
commercial activities—even successful, revenue-generating 
businesses—that serve an essential role in otherwise exempt 
organizational missions. For instance, colleges may operate 
bookstores and restaurants without risking their exempt status.
131
 An 
art school that sells the works created by its students, even for a profit 
which would be retained privately by the artist-students, may 
maintain its tax-exempt designation if the primary mission of the 
organization is educational.
132
 
Law schools offering free transactional legal services to 
entrepreneurs who hope to succeed in the marketplace and who will 
own the resulting profits are in an even stronger place than the art 
schools, because the law schools conduct no commercial activities. 
The clinics do not operate the businesses nor facilitate any private 
inurement involving the finances of the nonprofit entity.
133
 The sole 
reason to work with entrepreneurs is to advance the educational 
mission of the institution. No IRS or Tax Court authority would 
disallow that ancillary activity as long as the primary mission of the 
law school remains educational.
134
 
 
FOUNDATION, http://www.kauffman.org (last visited May 20, 2015); see also Ewing Marion 
Kauffman Foundation Listing, GUIDESTAR, http://www2.guidestar.org/organizations/43-
6064859/ewing-marion-kauffman-foundation.aspx (last visited May 20, 2015) (GuideStar 
listing Kauffman Foundation as a recognized nonprofit). 
 130. I.R.S. Gen. Couns. Mem. 39,862 (Nov. 22, 1991). 
 131. Rev. Rul. 58-194, 1958-1 C.B. 240 (bookstores and restaurants); Squire v. Students 
Book Corp., 191 F.2d 1018 (9th Cir. 1951) (finding a corporation organized to operate a 
campus bookstore and restaurant to be exempt “as being organized and operated exclusively for 
an educational purpose”); see also Rev. Rul. 76-336, 1976-2 C.B. 143 (college housing). 
 132. Goldsboro Art League v. Commissioner, 75 T.C. 337, 345 (1980). 
 133. In Goldsboro, the arts organization sold the artwork, collected applicable sales tax, 
maintained a commission for its marketing and sales services, and remitted the remaining 
proceeds to the artists. Id. at 340–41. 
 134. Cf. Rev. Rul. 73-128, 1973-1 C.B. 222 (“An organization that is otherwise qualified 
for exemption from income tax will not fail to qualify merely because its education and 
vocational training of unemployed and under-employed individuals is carried out through the 
manufacturing and selling of toy products.”). 
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Therefore, law schools that choose to educate students through the 
representation of companies and individuals dedicated to developing, 
or having developed, successful private businesses do not have any 
worry about jeopardizing their tax-exempt status. As noted above, the 
schools may have other misgivings about allocating their valuable 
free legal services to such private initiatives, but they have no 
concerns emanating from the IRS. 
C. Public Interest Law Firms 
Besides pro bono from private law firms and free legal services 
through the student work in law school clinics, another potential 
source of entrepreneurial TLS would be through private, nonprofit 
law firms or community-based organizations supporting the creation 
of new private businesses. There are two possible categories of 
NGOs that might offer such TLS. One does not seem to be 
cognizable as a tax-exempt organization under Section 501(c)(3); the 
other may be so, but would be unlikely, in the current political 
climate, to support entrepreneurial TLS, because of the triage 
considerations discussed above in Part II. 
The first NGO to consider is a public interest law firm (PILF), 
which is a term of art in the IRS context. The IRS will grant a PILF 
tax-exempt status under Section 501(c)(3) if the organization engages 
in litigation that serves the public interest.
135
 The IRS established 
guidelines in 1992 describing what qualities a firm that represents 
clients and receives fees for its representation must exhibit in order to 
qualify as a public charity. In those guidelines, the IRS focused on 
the most common, but not the exclusive, vehicle for achievement of 
social change—litigation.136 The Internal Revenue Manual, which 
 
 135. Rev. Proc. 92-59, 1992-2 C.B. 411; see also Kathryn A. Sabbeth, What’s Money Got 
to Do with It?: Public Interest Lawyering and Profit, 91 DENVER U. L. REV. 441, 469–70 
(2014). 
 136. Rev. Proc. 92-59, supra note 134. As several commentators have observed, the goal of 
Revenue Procedure 92-59 was to differentiate those fee-generating law firms that truly qualify 
as “public interest” firms and those that are essentially commercial practices serving a 
specialized clientele. See, e.g., Richard N. Goldsmith, The IRS Man Cometh: Public Interest 
Law Firms Meet the Tax Collector, 13 ARIZ. L. REV. 857, 859 (1971); Sabbeth, supra note 136, 
at 454–57; Ann Southworth, Conservative Lawyers and the Contest over the Meaning of 
“Public Interest Law,” 52 UCLA L. REV. 1223, 1249 n.137 (2005). Besides the commitment to 
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provides interpretive guidance to assist taxpayers, describes the 
requirements for a tax-exempt PILF as follows: 
To qualify for [Section 501(c)(3) tax] exemption, public 
interest law firms must adhere to the following: 
 The organization’s litigation must be designed to present a 
position on behalf of the public at large on matters of public 
interest. 
 The organization can not attempt to achieve its objectives 
by illegal activity or through a program of disruption of the 
judicial system. 
 The organization can not violate any canons of legal 
ethics.
137
 
Therefore, absent some forthcoming interpretive changes from the 
Service, a law firm established to provide entrepreneurial TLS to 
clients who paid some fees would seemingly not qualify for tax-
exempt status. 
But a second type of NGO would fare better under the IRS 
regime. A tax-exempt conventional legal services organization may 
offer free legal services without limiting its legal representation to 
those presenting “position[s] on behalf of the public at large on 
matters of public interest.”138 Conventional legal services 
organizations—the typical neighborhood legal aid organizations, for 
example—represent private parties pursuing purely private interests, 
even if collectively their achievements accomplish considerable 
public benefit. Such a legal aid organization will qualify as a tax-
exempt organization under Section 501(c)(3) not by its dedication to 
serving purely “public” interests but by its commitment to provide 
free or below-market services only to those clients who are poor or 
otherwise underrepresented.
139
 One observer has noted that the IRS 
 
litigation aimed at some public good, the PILF organizations face strict limits on the fees they 
may receive from clients. See Rev. Proc. 92-59, supra note 134. 
 137. Internal Revenue Manual § 4.76.9.3 (Apr. 1, 2003), available at http://www.irs.gov/ 
irm/part4/irm_04-076-009.html. 
 138. Id. 
 139. John D. Colombo, The Role of Access in Charitable Tax Exemption, 82 WASH. U. 
L.Q. 343, 362 (2004) (“Traditional ‘legal aid’ services for the poor have long been recognized 
Washington University Open Scholarship
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
52 Journal of Law & Policy [Vol. 48:11 
 
 
has permitted exempt status for “the familiar legal aid groups which 
provide representation for specifically identified groups, such as poor 
or underprivileged people that are traditionally recognized as objects 
of charity.”140 
For those organizations, no IRS regulation or guideline requires 
that the lawyers limit their work to litigation,
141
 and legal aid 
programs sometimes offer transactional or legislative advocacy 
services on behalf of community organizations.
142
 The salient quality 
of their work entitling them to tax-exempt status is the fact that the 
beneficiaries of their charitable work are poor or disadvantaged 
persons, a category expressly contemplated within the IRS’s Section 
501(c)(3) guidelines.
143
 Those IRS guidelines do not define “poor,”144 
and standard eligibility measures for legal services organizations 
typically do not inquire about whether the applicant has any control 
over whether he or she remains poor.
145
 A legal services organization 
that chose to represent entrepreneurs who do not have the resources 
available to hire private counsel, or organizations that have 
insufficient assets to obtain needed legal advice from the private 
market, would seemingly face no risks with its tax-exempt 
designation.
146
 
Therefore, in contrast to law firm pro bono departments or law 
school clinics, nonprofit legal services organizations confront in the 
 
as tax-exempt because they limit their services to individuals who cannot afford legal 
representation.”) 
 140. Oliver A. Houck, With Charity for All, 93 YALE L.J. 1415, 1443–44 (1984). 
 141. Rev. Proc. 71-39, 1971-2 C.B. 575 (1971). 
 142. See supra note 4 and accompanying text. 
 143. Treas. Reg. § 1.501(c)(3)-1(d)(2) (as amended in 2008); Laura B. Chisolm, Exempt 
Organization Advocacy: Matching the Rules to the Rationales, 63 IND. L.J. 201, 258–59 (1988). 
 144. Treas. Reg. § 1.501(c)(3)-1(d)(2) (as amended in 2008) (noting the criterion of “poor” 
without any definition of that term). 
 145. See Client Income Eligibility Standards, LEGAL SERVICES CORP., http://www.lsc.gov/ 
media/news-items/2013/client-income-eligibility-standards-updated-2013 (last visited Apr. 10, 
2015) (listing income limits); Income Eligibility Guidelines, GREATER BOSTON LEGAL 
SERVICES, http://www.gbls.org/get-legal-help/can-gbls-help-me (last visited May 20, 2015) 
(listing income limits without inquiry to reasons for being low-income). Of course, in choosing 
which of the many prospective clients to whom it will provide free legal services, a legal aid 
organization will likely consider as an important factor the likelihood that the prospective client 
could achieve a more favorable social status by taking advantage of available opportunities. 
 146. Cf. Colombo, supra note 140, at 345 (arguing that the defining quality for tax-
exemption is providing access to those who otherwise cannot obtain counsel). 
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most straightforward way the policy question with which this Article 
began: Is it a justifiable use of scarce legal services to provide 
lawyers to entrepreneurs who hope to be successful? While those 
organizations have fewer ancillary reasons to provide those services, 
as law firms and clinics do, they do face that question with a 
profound and understandable bias. That bias is the result of the 
immense, immediate needs of so many visible prospective clients in 
distress.
147
 It would require a powerful analytical and empirical thesis 
for a community-based legal aid organization to justify—to its intake 
staff (especially), its board, its donors and supporters, and the staff 
lawyers and advocates themselves—denying lawyers to families 
facing homelessness, vulnerable persons who need protection from 
domestic violence, disabled individuals who need income and 
medical care, children who have been denied appropriate schooling, 
and so forth, in order to assist entrepreneurs with their exciting new 
business ideas. Even if that thesis were available (and we saw above 
that it probably is not, especially for ecumenical, entrepreneurial 
TLS), the odds are it would not prevail, because of the rescue mission 
sentiments that play such an important cognitive role in an 
organization’s choice of clients. Hence, we see little, if any, 
entrepreneurial TLS emanating from neighborhood legal aid offices, 
and we are unlikely to see such in the future. 
IV. CONCLUSION 
Emerging businesses, startups, and beginning entrepreneurs have 
a genuine need for legal counsel in order to sustain their enterprises, 
and usually do not have the funds to pay for that assistance. As more 
organizations recognize that reality and offer free counsel to those 
clients, questions will arise about whether that allocation of a 
valuable and scarce asset is the wisest choice. This Article offers one 
beginning take on some answers to those questions. It is easy to 
conclude that offering free transactional legal services to social 
entrepreneurs and to collectives comprised of members of 
underserved communities is a justifiable use of scarce legal capital. 
Allocating those resources to purely entrepreneurial efforts is harder 
 
 147. See discussion supra at notes 19–20 and accompanying text. 
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to justify as a categorical matter, but may be a perfectly wise choice 
in some individual circumstances. If the question arises in the law 
firm or law school contexts, the missions of those institutions permit 
much greater flexibility and easier justification for supporting 
entrepreneurs. 
If nothing else, this Article should demonstrate that these 
questions deserve considerably more attention going forward, 
especially as the legal profession—along with the nation as a 
whole—embraces the continued growth of entrepreneurship, 
especially within previously underserved communities.
148
 
 
 148. For one example of a new program aimed at encouraging entrepreneurship within a 
historically neglected community, see SMARTER IN THE CITY, http://smarterinthecity.com/ 
index.html (last visited June 6, 2015) (high tech incubator in Dudley Square in Boston). 
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